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Abstract
We investigate the influence of public policy on interregional migration in Canada using new
interprovincial migration data constructed from personal income tax files for the years 1974 to 1996. We
consider the consequences for gross and net migration flows of regional variation in employment
insurance, provincial social assistance, personal income taxes and public spending of different types, and
we compare the effects of these policies to the impacts on migration of wages, employment prospects
and moving costs. We also conduct a preliminary investigation of  the migration consequences of certain
extraordinary political events in Quebec and of the closing of the cod fishery in Newfoundland.  
Unemployment insurance is an especially important and well documented source of income for many
people, and regional variation in the generosity of the insurance system over the last three decades has
been substantial. The results suggest that while increasing the generosity of the system in high
unemployment regions may have induced more migration to the Atlantic region than would otherwise
have occurred, the resulting changes in gross flows are probably not large and have had, at most, small
effects on average provincial unemployment rates. A variety of other interesting results is also provided.
JEL Classification: H0, H7, J41, J65, R23, R58
Keywords: migration, regional disparity, public policy, unemployment insurance, conditional logit,
taxation data  
11. See also Winer and Gauthier (1982, 3), Watson (1986)  and Usher (1995, 142), for examples of how
intergovernmental grants that are too generous relative to what is required for national economic efficiency may
similarly lead to a national  misallocation of labour services.  
1.  Introduction
A leading, and still controversial, explanation for the persistence of regional disparity in Canada – the
transfer dependency thesis – points to the adverse effects of unduly subsidizing people to remain in relatively
disadvantaged provinces. In this view, public policies which favour people in some regions over those in
others lead to domestic migration decisions that are unrelated to the real productivity of labour in alternative
destinations. To the extent that labour services are not located where they are most productive, average
earned income in the country as a whole declines, and the regional disparity in earned incomes increases
(Graham 1964; Courchene 1970, 1978; Boadway and Flatters 1982 a,b). 
An important example of a public program that may attenuate the link between internal migration
and labour productivity is the unemployment insurance system. At least since 1971, this ‘insurance’ program
has been more generous to people who live in regions with above average unemployment rates. The program
thus creates differences across regions in the portion of an individual's total or comprehensive income that
originates in the public sector. Since people base their location decisions on a comparison of comprehensive
incomes, and not just on a comparison of their earned or pre-transfer labour incomes, regional differences
in the public component of comprehensive incomes created by the unemployment insurance system may lead
to a misallocation of labour across the country.1
The fact that regional differences in public policies exist in Canada is indisputable.  Figures 1 and
2 present coefficients of variation across provinces of several federal and provincial policy variables – real
per capita federal current and net capital spending, minimum weeks required to qualify for unemployment
insurance (UI) benefits, maximum weeks of UI benefits to which a person with minimum qualifying weeks
is entitled, real per capita provincial spending on health, real per capita provincial spending on education,
real per capita provincial spending on other functions (excluding social assistance and debt service), the real
2personal income tax burden, and real social assistance payments for a single mother with two children.  For
comparison purposes, Figure 3 presents the unweighted coefficients of variation of real average weekly
earnings and provincial unemployment rates. These figures show that public policies exhibit levels of relative
regional dispersion that are comparable to those of wages and unemployment rates, two labour market
variables commonly believed to influence migration decisions.
[Figures 1, 2 and 3 here.]
However, the extent to which the regional differences in public policies illustrated in Figures 1and
2 actually alter migration patterns is another matter. Since migration usually involves a substantial fixed cost,
personal migration decisions may not be greatly affected by existing regional differentials in the public
component of comprehensive incomes if those differentials are not ‘large.’  It is possible that even the effect
of UI on comprehensive incomes is not big enough to alter individual migration decisions substantially in
comparison to the effects of changing market conditions. 
Although there is empirical evidence that public policy has affected migration patterns to some
extent, notably in the work of Courchene (1970), Winer and Gauthier (1982), Shaw (1986) and Day  (1992),
in the pre-1995 literature as a whole (reviewed in Day  and Winer 1994) there is no consensus concerning
the empirical significance and quantitative importance of the relationship.  More recently, Lin (1995), using
the Labour Market Activity Survey longitudinal data set for the 1988-90 period, found that interprovincial
migration behaviour does not depend on whether a person has received unemployment insurance or social
assistance benefits.  On the other hand, using the Longitudinal Administrative Data set based on personal
tax files for 1982-95, Finnie (2000) found that the receipt of unemployment  insurance is associated with a
statistically significant increase in out-migration of prime-aged men and women (the quantitative importance
of the effect is not computed).  However, neither of these interesting contributions take the generosity of the
unemployment insurance system into account, and thus there remains the possibility that the receipt of
unemployment insurance (dummy) variable used is acting as a proxy for employment opportunities, rather
32. The larger version of the study on which this paper is based, Day and Winer (2001), utilizes data for 1968 to
1996: the 68 - 73 data are from a 10% sample, while the 74 - 96 data are based on the complete tax tapes. Migration
flows are also disaggregated by age and sex as well as by income. Conclusions reached are essentially the same as
those reported in this paper. 
than reflecting the operation of the insurance system itself.  Thus, considering the literature in Canada as a
whole, it is reasonable to conclude that the premiss of the transfer dependency thesis – that policy-induced
migration is an important phenomenon in Canada – and, therefore, the thesis itself, remain to be confirmed.
In this paper we investigate once again the strength and nature of policy-induced migration in
Canada, using gross flow data on the interprovincial migration of personal income tax filers grouped by
income class for the period from 1974 to 1996.  The model we construct for this purpose differs from those
used previously to study internal migration in Canada, especially with respect to the way in which
unemployment insurance is treated.  We also include in the model as many policy parameters that vary across
regions as is reasonably possible given data availability.  Since the public sector differentiates between
taxpayers to a considerable extent on the basis of income, disaggregation by income class is useful in
constructing a representation of the role of the public sector.2 The long time period covered by the data
allows us to include periods in the 1970's when, as shown in Figures 1 and 2, there were important changes
in policy parameters.
 The paper is organized as follows. In section two we present an econometric model of individual
migration decisions.  The data are discussed in section three, and estimation results are presented in section
four.  In section five, we discuss a number of policy simulations based on the estimation that explore the
effects of regional variation in selected public policies.  Conclusions, limitations of the analysis and
suggestions for future research complete the paper.
2.  A model of interprovincial migration flows
It is straightforward to conceive of the decision by an individual to move from province i to province j as the
outcome of utility maximization: each individual is assumed to choose province j over all other provinces
43.  The log-linear functional form (described in section 2.1) that we choose for the direct utility function would be
undefined in state 1 if this state did not include any leisure time.
4.  See Phipps (1990) for an illustration of this budget constraint.  For an overview of the evolution of the Canadian
unemployment insurance system, now called Employment Insurance, see Lin (1998) or Dingledine et al. (1995). 
if his or her utility is higher in j.  Policy variables such as income tax rates and levels of public services may
be introduced into the standard utility maximization problem of a prospective migrant relatively easily:
income tax rates enter the individual’s budget constraint, while public goods can be incorporated as
arguments of the utility function.  However, introducing policies such as unemployment insurance (UI) and
social assistance (SA) benefits, receipt of which is contingent upon the individual being unemployed, is more
difficult.  The  existence of these types of transfer payments is contingent on an individual’s employment
status, and may alter the individual’s work/leisure decision.  
In this study, we focus on how uncertainty about employment prospects in different regions interacts
with the UI system to affect the migration decision.  We assume that for each individual, the number of
weeks of work in each possible destination is a discrete random variable that takes on only four possible
values. In state 1, individuals work a total of 50 weeks, leaving them two weeks of leisure time.3  In state 2,
individuals work a total of MXYR weeks, where MXYR is the number of weeks of work such that the
individual would be able to spend the remainder of the year collecting UI benefits. 
In state 3, individuals work only MIN weeks, the minimum number of weeks required to qualify for
UI benefits, and they spend the remainder of the year collecting a combination of UI and SA  benefits.  The
insurance system and the social assistance systems of the provinces thus jointly determine income in state
3.  Finally, in state 4,  it is assumed that individuals spend the entire year on social assistance and do not
work.  These four states correspond, in a stylized manner, to important kinks in an individual’s annual budget
constraint induced by the UI and SA systems in existence in Canada during our sample period.4 
Since labour supply is a discrete random variable, as described above, the utility-maximizing
migration decision can be formalized in the following manner.  Let Bjs be the ex ante probability, as seen by
the individual, that state s will occur in province or region  j.  Assume further that these province-specific
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aggregate probabilities are independent of individual migration decisions, and independent of the region of
origin.  Then, from the perspective of a person currently resident in province i, expected utility in  j is 
where Uijs is the maximum utility that an individual originating in i would enjoy in province j in state s.  
The individual chooses to reside in the province or region that yields the highest expected utility.
In other words, an individual in i will move to j if 
where EUij is the maximum expected utility that an individual from province of origin i would enjoy in
province of destination j,  and J is the total number of provinces.  If j happens to be the individual’s province
of origin (i.e., if j = i), the individual will not move.  
The above model emphasizes the role of migration in utility optimization.  Indeed, because labour
supply is assumed to be fixed in each state of the world, location is the only margin on which individuals are
assumed to adjust.  It is also worth noting that (2) implies that migration decisions depend on differences in
total expected utility across alternative destinations. Thus, for example, while some aspects of the UI system
may affect the relative price of leisure, as interesting studies of this effect (such as Sargent 1995) have
shown, what matters in the present context is how the insurance system alters total expected utility in
different locations.  For this reason, the representation of the UI system in this paper is different than in
studies designed to measure the effects of this system on the relative price of leisure.
In the following three sections of the paper, we deal with the specification of the expected utility
function, some extensions of the basic model, and the derivation of a likelihood function.
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2.1  Detailed specification of the expected utility function
In order to provide more structure for the expected utility function, we need an assumption about the
utility function,  and a detailed specification of the constraints facing any individual in each location. We
assume that in each province and state of the world individuals maximize the following Cobb-Douglas utility
function: 
where "1 and "2 are individual coefficients, and "3Nand "4N are vectors of coefficients.  As before, the
subscript i indicates the province of origin, j the province of destination, and s the state of the world.  X is
real consumption; T is the total time (in weeks) available for work or leisure; L is weeks of work; F is a
vector of real fiscal benefits, such as those associated with the provision of education and health care; and
A is a vector of locational amenities, including cultural and linguistic factors, that may affect the individual’s
utility.
In each province and each state of the world, the individual is assumed to maximize the utility
function (3) subject to a budget constraint and a constraint that defines the number of weeks of work
available to the individual in the particular province and state of the world:
where
In the budget constraint, q is the price of consumption goods; w is the individual’s wage, which is assumed
to be identical in all states of the world; UI is income from unemployment insurance benefits; SA is social
75.  It is possible to rewrite the budget constraint in terms of the marginal tax rate.  While its form has no bearing on
estimation, it is convenient to reformulate the budget constraint as a function of the marginal tax rate in order to
derive the derivatives of the migration rates Pij with respect to the various components of income.  We present one
such derivative below. See Day and Winer (2001), Appendix E, for the reformulated versions of after-tax income net
of moving costs.  
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assistance income; B is interest and investment income; TR is personal transfers from the public sector other
than UI and SA; C is the sum of the before-tax direct and indirect (foregone wage) monetary costs of moving;
and TAX is total federal and provincial income tax.5  In the labour supply constraint, MXYR is the number
of weeks of work required to ensure that the  individual will receive UI benefits for the remainder of the year,
while MIN is the minimum number of weeks of work required to qualify for regular UI benefits.  Note that
some components in (4) depend on i and j, while others are assumed to depend on either i or j but not both.
The three components of income that depend on the state of the world are defined as follows:
and
where D is the benefit-replacement rate (0 # D # 1); wR is the before-tax replaceable wage; MINWKS is the
maximum number of weeks of UI benefits that a person with MIN weeks of work can receive, and SA
represents annual social assistance benefits.  
As equations (6) to (8) indicate, there are two states of the world in which individuals receive some
income from unemployment insurance, and two states of the world in which they receive some income from
8(9)
(10)
social assistance.  The two-week waiting period for UI benefits is taken into account in the calculation of
incomes in states 2 and 3.  In state 4, social assistance and transfers from the federal government (TR) are
the only sources of income.
 Once the Uijs have been obtained by solving the utility maximization problem for each state of the
world in each province, they are substituted into equation (1) to obtain the following expression for the
expected utility in province j of an individual originating in province i:
In equation (9), after-tax incomes net of moving costs in the four states of the world are denoted INCijs  and,
using the fact that T = 52, may be written as:
It should be noted that since equation (9) is derived from the direct utility function given in equation
(3), a simple utility-related interpretation of the signs of the coefficients is available.  In the direct utility
function, a ‘good’ (that is, a commodity that provides positive utility) will have a positive sign, and a ‘bad’
will have a negative sign.  Thus, because in the direct utility function they are the coefficients of consumption
and leisure time, both of which are generally considered to be ‘goods,’  estimates of both "1 and "2 in
96.  Note that the consumption good’s price, qj, appears separately from the income terms in (9) because it is assumed
to be the same in all states of the world.
7.  It should be noted that this dummy variable does not serve to identify stayers.  Rather, it adds an extra term to the
utility associated with the staying option for all individuals, whether movers or stayers.  Each potential migrant will
compare utilities across all options in making his or her migration decision.
equation (9) are expected to be positive.  Similarly, any fiscal variable F or locational amenity A whose
estimated coefficient is positive (negative) can be interpreted as providing positive (negative) utility to
individuals.6
It is also important to note that equations (9) and (10) indicate why the incentive to move embedded
in the UI system (or other aspects of public policy)  cannot be captured by a single index variable.  Rather,
differences in the probability weighted log-incomes and probability weighted log-leisure times, not in
individual UI (or other) policy parameters, are what matter.  We examine the nature of these broader
measures later, after dealing with some essential issues of data construction.
2.2    Extensions of the basic model
The basic model of expected utility defined by equations (9) and (10) may be usefully extended in
several  ways.  First, to allow for more risk aversion than the Cobb-Douglas functional form implies, we add
to (9) the probabilities associated with less than full employment states.  This modification also allows for
the possibility that individuals value employment in and of itself.
Second, we add two variables to reflect non-monetary moving costs that are not incorporated in the
variable Cij.  The distance between the province of origin and the province of destination is added to capture
the non-monetary costs of moving that increase with distance, while a dummy variable equal to one if the
choice involves a move and zero otherwise is included to account for fixed costs of moving, such as the
psychic cost of leaving family and friends behind and re-establishing one’s home in a new location, the costs
of selling a home, and the costs of finding a new place to live.  The inclusion of this dummy variable in the
model ensures that the utility associated with staying,  EUii, will differ from the expected utility associated
with all moves (EUij, j … i) even if the attributes of all regions are identical.7
10
8. This is a standard practice in modelling interregional migration in Canada.
9.  One alternative must be excluded to avoid the equivalent of a dummy variable trap. 
(11)
Third, we added dummy variables to allow consideration of two extraordinary events related to the
public sector, the effects of which are probably not adequately captured by the other private and public sector
variables of the model – the election of a separatist government in Quebec in 1976 and the subsequent
introduction of language legislation in 1977, and the closing of the cod fishery on the east coast in 1992.
Since a decision to move often carries with it substantial fixed costs – for example, the cost of moving away
from ‘home’ –  regional differences in the private and public sectors in more ordinary times may not generate
incentives that are sufficient to overcome such costs.  However, extraordinary events, such as those in
Quebec and on the east coast fishery, may still create migration incentives that are substantial enough to
overcome the fixed costs of moving. We use dummy variables to allow for the possibility that these two
events had an important impact on inflows to and outflows from Quebec during the 1977-1980 period, and
on inflows to and outflows from Newfoundland from 1993 to the end of our sample period.
Finally, we include dummy variables to control for the effects of language and province-specific
amenities.  The possibility that the predominance of French in Quebec might deter in-migration to Quebec
from other provinces is accounted for by including a dummy variable that is equal to one if the alternative
under consideration is a move to Quebec and the province of origin is not Quebec, and zero otherwise.8
Amenities such as climate, which do not change much over time, are dealt with by including alternative-
specific (i.e., province-specific) dummy variables for all alternatives except British Columbia.9
2.3  The likelihood function
To derive a likelihood function for the model, we adopt the conditional multinomial logit model first
proposed by McFadden (1974).  This model assumes that the expected utility of an individual chosen at
random from the population is given by 
11
10.  Pudney (1989, 112) notes that it is implausible to assume that the form of the function EUij is the same for all
alternatives.  One way of dealing with this problem is to include an additive alternative-specific constant to the
function, as we do in this study.
11.  In Day and Winer (2001), groups are also defined by age and sex in addition to income.
12. It may be noted that since all of the explanatory variables used are averages over the population of a province as
a whole rather than over the members of the group, the issue of selectivity bias does not arise.  
(12)
(13)
where EUij is defined by equation (1), and gij is a random error representing attributes of alternative j that are
pertinent to the individual but which the researcher cannot systematically observe or model.10
As McFadden (1974) has shown, if the gij, j = 1, ..., J, where J is the number of alternatives, are
 assumed to be independently and identically distributed across individuals with an extreme value 
distribution, then the probability that any individual in region i will choose alternative j is given by 
The probability of staying in i rather than moving is Pii .
In the case of aggregate or grouped data, such as we use in this study, a likelihood function can be
constructed using (12) by assuming that all individuals in a particular group are identical.  If we define h to
be an index of the specific group to which an individual belongs, where nijh  (possibly equal to zero) is the
number of individuals from region i in group h, then the log-likelihood function for a sample of H groups in
each of J regions is 
where Pijh is given by equation (12).  In this study, groups are defined by income class.
11   The estimates of
Pijh resulting from the maximum likelihood estimation procedure are estimates of the migration rate for the
corresponding group.12  Note that the fact that the expected utility function (9) is linear in parameters
guarantees that the log-likelihood function has a global optimum.
12
13.  Construction of the data used in this study was a substantial project in its own right.  The data were also
extended backward to 1968 with the help of tapes containing the partial tax records of a 10% sample of Canadians
for the period 1967-1973, but estimation results based on the extended data set are not presented here. For further
details, see Day and Winer (2001). Results of estimation over the longer period are consistent with the conclusions
reached below.
14.  All tax filers under the age of thirty who claimed a tuition deduction of at least about three-quarters of the
average university tuition payed in Canada each year in each province were assumed to be students.  This rule will
not eliminate all students, however, since many transfer the deduction to a parent.
15.  In 1995, for example, median total income for all tax filers in our data set is about $24,142, or about 62.5% of
the median income for families and unattached individuals reported in Statistics Canada catalogue 13-207.  The
lower median income in the tax data in part reflects the fact that since families do not file joint tax returns in Canada,
the income of each spouse is recorded separately. Median total income in the tax files is consistently lower than
median family income, although the ratio of the two varies from year to year.
3.  Data
In this section we provide a brief description of the migration data and the data used to represent the 
explanatory variables of the model.  Further details regarding the construction of the data are provided in an
extensive appendix in Day and Winer (2001).
3.1   The migration data
The migration data for the 1974-1996 period are constructed from personal income tax records for
the tax years 1973-1996.13  For any tax filer, interprovincial migration is assumed to have occurred sometime
during the second of two adjacent tax years if the individual reports a different province of residence on
December 31st of the second year.  All tax filers are included in our migration counts, with the exception of:
(i) those younger than 20 or older than 64;  (ii) immigrants, emigrants, and persons migrating to or from the
northern territories; (iii) persons who died during the tax year; (iv) those with no income from wages and
salaries, self-employment, UI, or social assistance; and (v) full-time students.14  These exclusions were
designed to restrict the data set to individuals who are attached to the labour market.  For each individual
remaining in the data set, both the province of origin and the province of destination were recorded for each
year from 1974 to 1996.  The tax filers were then grouped into three income classes, based on their total
income as defined by Revenue Canada (TIRC):15
13
16.  As noted earlier, the data were also classified by age and sex as well as by income class. For additional results
using the age/sex/income class data, see Day and Winer (2001).
17.  Researchers interested in using these data should contact the Business and Labour Market Analysis Division of
Statistics Canada.  The conditions for using the data include being sworn in under the Statistics Act, and working
with the data on Statistics Canada premises. We are grateful to Garnett Picot and Statistics Canada for making this
arrangement.
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Finally, the number of individuals in each cell of the data set was recorded, with cells being defined
by year, province of origin, province of destination, and income class.16  These numbers constitute the gross
flow data used for estimation.
Since these migration data are derived from individual tax records, strict confidentiality conditions
apply to their use.  Despite the fact that we began with the complete set of tax returns filed in each year,
many of the migration cells with an origin and a destination in one of the smaller provinces contain very few
individuals, and do not meet Statistics Canada’s conditions for their publication.  Rather than work with a
publishable data set that contains many censored cells, we employ the uncensored migration data.  Statistics
Canada has, however, agreed to retain this data for a period of ten years, and to make them available without
cost to other researchers interested in confirming the results reported here.17
3.2   The explanatory variables
A list of the explanatory variables included in the empirical model, together with their definitions
and the expected signs of their coefficients, is provided in Table 1.  Note that the first two variables,
INCOME and LEISURE, are composite variables that are defined as follows:
where INCijs is defined in equation (10).  
14
18. There are disadvantages of using grouped data, including the possibility of aggregation bias. Resource
constraints prevented us from constructing longitudinal data for each individual taxpayer from 1974. Such microdata
do exist from 1982 (the LAD data set), but this data set obviously does not include evidence from the 1970s when
the unemployment insurance system was substantially altered. We regard the present project as a useful complement
to one based on longitudinal microdata data such as the LAD. The latter project is a challenging and expensive one
that remains for future research.   
19.  In fact, the number of UI regions has increased over the years.
20.  For all provinces except Quebec, provincial income taxes are computed as a percentage of federal income tax
owing.  In the case of Quebec, provincial income taxes were computed separately using the Quebec income tax
schedule.
21.  We are indebted to Pierre Lefevbre for providing us with these data.
22.  Létourneau (1992) attempts to measure regional differences in price levels in Canada for the 82-98 period.
[Table 1 here.]
One advantage of working with grouped data, as we do here, rather than microdata, is that we are
able to avoid the problem of estimating incomes for individuals in alternative destinations by using averages
over the population in each province.18  Thus INCijs is constructed using data on average weekly earnings and
average nonwage income, among other variables.  The UI variables MINj, MINWKSj, and MAXYRj are
constructed using provincial unemployment rates and the provisions of the UI Act, under the assumption that
each province constitutes a single UI region.19  Similarly, the replaceable wage wj
R is computed using average
weekly earnings in each province. TAXijs is estimated using the actual federal tax schedule and provincial
income tax rates, under the assumption that the migrant is single and claims only the personal exemption/tax
credit.20  The last component of income, annual SA income in province j, is approximated by the annual SA
income for a single mother with two children, the only measure which is available on a consistent basis for
all provinces throughout the time period studied.21  Unfortunately, it is impossible to obtain data on any of
these income components that varies with income class.
Regional city consumer price indices for the major city in each of the ten provinces are used to
represent qj.  The regional city CPIs adjust for inflation but do not reflect differences in price levels across
provinces.  (A consistent index that measures differences in the cost of living across provinces does not exist
for our entire sample period.)22
In representing real fiscal benefits, it is preferable to include in the empirical model variables that
15
23. Winer and Gauthier (1982) point out and explicitly deal with the double counting problem by omitting some
(arbitrarily chosen) elements of provincial government budget restraints. As indicated above, it is better to have in
the empirical model policy variables that are as closely connected as possible to what people actually receive from or
pay to the public sector.  The role of intergovernmental grants may be studied by constructing a model of the effect
of grants on provincial government spending and taxing decisions, and then combining the results of this study with
estimates of the effects of provincial fiscal policies on migration behaviour. 
reflect as closely as possible the benefits received by individuals.  This approach also motivates our
modelling of the role of unemployment insurance and social assistance.  However, measures of the benefits
of public services actually received by individuals are not available on a time series basis.  As in Day (1992)
and MacNevin (1984), we must use (as elements of the vector F)  real per capita consolidated provincial and
local government spending on health, education, and other functions, excluding spending on social services
and debt service, from Statistics Canada’s Financial Management System (FMS).  These data include both
current and capital spending by provincial governments.  Social services are excluded from F because they
are already accounted for in the model by the inclusion of social assistance in the definition of income in
states three and four, as discussed above.  We do include in F per capita total federal current and capital
spending in each province (data on federal spending by function are not available by province). All four
fiscal variables are deflated using the regional city CPI.
It is appropriate at this point to note that federal transfers to the provinces are omitted from the
model, in contrast to Courchene (1970) and Winer and Gauthier (1982).  Intergovernmental transfers will
influence people to the extent that they affect an individual’s consumption of public services or tax burdens.
Since we have already included in the model, in principle at least, both the tax and expenditure sides of
provincial fiscal systems, adding intergovernmental grants would amount to double counting.23   
Finally, we turn to the measurement of the probabilities of the states of the world. Because the
unemployment rate series published by Statistics Canada do not correspond to the four states defined in the
model, we estimate the probabilities of the four states using employment data from the Labour Force Survey
(nEj), together with data on the number of individuals receiving UI benefits in each province (nUIj), the
number of social assistance cases in each province (nSAj), the number of UI recipients with more than twenty
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qualifying weeks of employment, and the number of UI recipients with less than twenty qualifying weeks
of employment.  Letting be the proportion of UI recipients with more than twenty qualifying weeksp j20+
and the proportion of UI recipients with less than twenty qualifying weeks, the ex ante probabilitiesp j<20
of the four states of the worlds are approximated as follows:
One problem with these estimates is that while the ex ante probabilities in the model are defined in
terms of the distribution of weeks of work across the labour force,  nEj, nUIj, and nSAj are all measures of the
stock of individuals in a particular state at a particular point in time.  A better measure of the true Bj1, for
example, might be the proportion of the labour force that enjoys at least 50 weeks of work each year.
However, the Labour Force Survey  measure of employment includes individuals who are in the middle of
shorter spells of employment as well as those who are in the middle of long spells, and thus Bj1 may tend to
overestimate the number of individuals in state 1.  The choice of twenty weeks of work as the dividing line
between states 2 and 3, rather than some value between MINj and MXYRj, is also an approximation that is
likely to be more accurate for some provinces than for others.  It does coincide,  however, with the usual
notion of the dividing line between workers who are “strongly attached” and “weakly attached” to the labour
force.  Unfortunately, data on the distribution of weeks of work by province is limited, necessitating the
approximations in (17).
Before turning to the estimation results, it is interesting to look at regional variation in the INCOME
and LEISURE variables defined in (15) and (16), and in selected components of them, especially the
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24. Thus, indexes of unemployment insurance generosity, based on parameters of the unemployment insurance
system, by themselves, may not be reliable as indicators of migration incentives.  
probability weighted logs of real incomes in states 2 and 3 which more directly reflect (than do INCOME
and LEISURE)  the migration incentives embedded in the unemployment insurance system.  Figure 4 shows
the coefficient of variation of these variables from 1966 to 1996. It can be seen that the coefficient of
variation of the component of INCOME stemming from state 3  is larger and increasing relative to the state
2 component.  This is largely the result of movements in Bj2, j = 1,..., 10, rather than in parameters of the
insurance system itself.  One may also note that regional variation in the LEISURE variable is greater than
that for INCOME over the entire period from 1966, and that the substantial regional variation in the income
components associated with states 2 and  3 does not carry over to the fuller measures of expected income and
expected leisure.  
[Figures 4 and 5 here.]
Figure 5 shows the consequences of the insurance system for the probability-weighted income
differentials between Ontario and Newfoundland in states 2 and 3.  This figure suggests that until reforms
were introduced in the early 1990s, the insurance system was increasingly biased in favour of weakly
attached labour market participants who registered for unemployment insurance in  Newfoundland.  Since
the major changes in insurance policy parameters occurred in 1971, 1974, 1979 and 1994, it can also be
inferred from Figure 5 that movements in the probabilities of employment as well as in incomes if
unemployed are important in determining migration incentives.  This is not surprising; incentives to move
created by the insurance system depend on both the income received in any location as well as the probability
that an individual will need to rely on UI there.  In the end, what matters to individuals (in our model) is how
the variables INCOME and LEISURE, which take both of these factors into account, are affected by changes
in UI parameters.24  Of course, indexes of incentives to move are one thing, and the effect of such incentives
on observed migration patterns is another.  
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25. Estimation was carried out using LIMDEP 7.0. 
26. The full matrices are available in Day and Winer (2001).
4.  Estimation results
Maximum likelihood estimates of two versions of the model for each of three income classes for the period
1974-1996 are presented in Table 2. 25  As indicated in Table 1, the two versions of the model differ only in
the variables included to account for additional risk aversion. Theory does not provide any guidance as to
the form in which the additional risk aversion variables should be included; the two models presented
represent two of the several alternatives we considered.   In Model 1, the untransformed probabilities of all
three unemployment states are allowed to enter the model separately.  In Model 2, the natural log of the sum
of the probabilities of the three unemployment states is included instead.
[Table 2 here.]
The overall fit of the model, as measured by McFadden’s R2, is quite good for all income classes and
both models; all the R2 values exceed 0.9.  However, the correlations between the actual and fitted values
of the 100 different origin-destination migration rates are often very low or even negative, ranging from  
-0.4372 to 0.9002 for Model 1 and  -0.7749 to 0.9163 for Model 2.26  Thus the model does not do a good job
of explaining many of the individual origin-destination migration rates.  Correlations between the actual and
fitted values of aggregate in-, out-, and net in-migration flows for each province,  presented in Table 3, tend
to be considerably higher.  For this reason, in reporting the results of simulations below, we restrict our
attention to in-, out-, and net migration flows.  
[Table 3 here.]
Turning now to the parameter estimates in Table 2, it can be seen that the values of the coefficients
of INCOME, LEISURE and the public expenditure variables are sensitive to the manner in which the
probabilities of unemployment are included in the model. The coefficients on INCOME and LEISURE for
Model 1 tend to be larger, for each income class, than the corresponding estimates for Model 2.  In one case,
for the high income class in Model 2, the coefficient on the leisure term is negative and statistically
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27. Negative coefficients also appear for Models 1 and 2 when the data are disaggregated by age and sex as well as
by income class.  In Model  1, the estimated coefficient of one or more of the additional risk aversion variables is
positive in 19 of 54 cases, especially for female groups. (There are 18 income class-age-sex categories and 3
employment probabilities.)  For Model 2, 4 of 18 coefficients on the single variable reflecting employment states are
positive. We note that when the unemployment insurance simulations reported below are conducted using these
diaggregated models, and the results are then aggregated up, conclusions remain essentially the same as reported in
this paper.  
insignificant.27 The sensitivity of the estimates can be attributed to collinearity between the probabilities of
the states of the world, the variable LEISURE, and to a lesser extent, the public expenditure variables and
INCOME. 
LEISURE is a function of the variables MIN and MXYR.  Due to the structure of the Canadian UI
system, both MIN and MXYR are lower in high unemployment provinces, resulting in a higher value for
LEISURE in such provinces.  Needless to say, the probabilities of the three unemployment states are highly
correlated with the Labour Force Survey’s provincial unemployment rates, resulting in a strong correlation
between LEISURE and the probabilities of the three states. It should be noted, however, that experiments
with alternative models indicate that it is important to have the probabilities in the model to allow for
aversion to regions where employment prospects are relatively poor. Omission of these variables leads to
coefficients on income that are often negative, likely because the INCOME variable then acts to some extent
as a proxy for undesirable employment prospects as well as for wages.  
 The signs of the coefficients on HEALTH, EDUCATION, and FEDERAL SPENDING also differ
across the two models, suggesting that the collinearity problem extends to these variables as well. We can
think of no good reason why people might value additional amounts of publicly provided goods such as
health care negatively.  Perhaps the fiscal  aggregates that we have to use in lieu of better measures of public
services received are more highly correlated with the other explanatory variables than the actual benefits
received would be.  It is also possible that these fiscal aggregates are picking up the influence of other factors
not accounted for elsewhere in the model. 
Despite the collinearity problem, the coefficient of  INCOME is generally positive, suggesting that
individuals do prefer regions with higher expected incomes.  This result is consistent with other studies of
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interprovincial migration in Canada.  The negative coefficient of DISTANCE is also consistent with our
expectations and other studies, and implies that the costs of migration increase with distance from the point
of origin.  The positive coefficient of DSTAY, which takes on the value 1 for choices that do not involve a
move, implies that there are indeed substantial fixed costs associated with migration away from one’s home.
The coefficient of QUEBEC always has a negative sign, suggesting that language does form a barrier to in-
migration to that province. (The coefficients of DISTANCE, DSTAY, QUEBEC, and the variables related
to extraordinary events are all stable across different specifications of the model.)
The positive coefficient of PQ for all models and all income classes suggests that the election of a
separatist government and subsequent events in the mid to late 1970s led to an increase in out-migration from
the province; although this accords with much anecdotal evidence, estimating this effect in the present
context is another matter. Unexpectedly, the coefficient of PQ2 is also positive, indicating that inflows to
Quebec also increased (though not nearly by as much, as the simulation reported immediately below shows).
It is possible that this increased inflow consists of former Quebecers returning to their home province.
The signs of the coefficients of PQ and PQ2 may not tell the whole story of the extraordinary events
in Quebec, though.  If other explanatory variables such as average weekly earnings or the probabilities of the
unemployment states also changed, then the effect of the dummy variables on migration flows is likely to
represent a lower bound on the total effect.  Nonetheless, it is still of interest to examine the magnitude of
the effect on migration to and from Quebec by comparing the predicted migration flows when PQ and PQ2
are equal to 1, to the predicted flow when PQ and PQ2 are equal to 0.  Both the individual effects of these
two variables and their net effect on in-migration to Quebec are presented in Table 4.  The impact on inflows
to Quebec was greatest for the middle and low income groups, while the impact on outflows was greatest for
the middle and higher income groups.  Over the 1977-1980 period as a whole, the cumulative effect of the
political events captured by the Quebec dummy variables is estimated to be an increase in net out-migration
of between 26,000 (Model 1) and 33,000 (Model 2) people.  By way of comparison, the actual net outflow
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28.  We are grateful to Michael Hatfield of HRDC for this suggestion.
from Quebec (in our migration data) during the 4 years after the election of the Parti Quebécois was 50,600
people.
[Table 4 here.]
Table 4 also presents estimates of the additional effect of the closing of the cod fishery in 1992 on
migration to and from Newfoundland, over and above any effect due to related changes in incomes and
unemployment rates.  Interestingly, inflows to rather than outflows from Newfoundland seem to be the most
affected, registering large decreases for all three income classes.  It is possible that this pattern reflects the
effect of the TAGS income subsidy program for fishers, as in-migrants were not eligible for benefits under
TAGS, but this remains a conjecture.28
The total effect of the closing is substantial, although considerably smaller for Model 2 than for
Model 1.  The Model 1 estimates imply a net loss of about 26,000 people, while the Model 2 estimates imply
a net loss of less than 18,000 people.  These estimated  increases in net outflows of tax filers are greater than
the actual net outflow (in our data set) of 14,500.  The discrepancy between the actual and predicted outflows
may be a prediction error, or it may be that other variables included in the model change in an offsetting
manner.
Finally, the pattern of signs on the alternative-specific dummy variables indicates that people are
generally moving to the west coast  ( B.C. is the omitted province).  Perhaps the most interesting finding here
is that the coefficient of QUE is positive, while those for all other provinces are generally negative.  In other
words, after allowing for a general tendency for migration to Quebec to be different from that to other
provinces (using the QUEBEC dummy discussed earlier), this positive coefficient suggest that some migrants
view Quebec as having some amenities that are more desirable than those of the other provinces.
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29.  See Day and Winer (2001) for discussion of marginal effects.  Among other things, the marginal effect
calculations reveal that interaction of the UI and provincial SA systems matters for the effect of changes in the
insurance system, especially when MINWKS is considered.  Increases in MINWKS lead to increases in net in-
migration only in Newfoundland, Quebec, and Manitoba, because it is only in these provinces that after-tax weekly
unemployment insurance benefits, as constructed for this project, are larger than weekly SA benefits. In the other
provinces, increases in MINWKS lead to decreases in net in-migration, regardless of the model used. Another
interesting finding is that the change in the Quebec income tax rate that is required to produce the same effect on net
in-migration as a one-dollar change in average weekly earnings (in the same province) is much larger than that for
the other provinces. This result indicates that net out-migration from Quebec is less responsive to personal tax
changes than that from the other provinces. Since Quebec has the highest income tax rate of all the provinces, this
result suggests that Quebec has taken advantage of a relatively sluggish response of migration to tax increases.
5.  The effect of eliminating regional variation in the determinants of migration
Although the coefficient estimates tell us something about the direction of the effects on migration rates of
changes in the explanatory variables, they cannot alone tell us anything about the magnitude of those effects.
In this paper, simulation is the primary method we use to explore the quantitative importance of the
estimation results.  The simulations are designed to uncover the consequences for migration of the
elimination of all regional variation in some key policy variables: MIN, the minimum weeks of work required
to qualify for UI benefits; regionally extended UI benefits; per capita federal spending; per capita spending
on education; provincial income tax rates; and social assistance benefits.29  To our knowledge, such
simulations have not been conducted before, even though regional variation in public policy is at the heart
of concern over the economic consequences of fiscally-induced migration.
In order to put the policy simulations into better perspective, we also simulate the effects of
eliminating regional dispersion in average weekly earnings and the probabilities of the four states of the
world, and of eliminating monetary and nonmonetary moving costs.  All simulations are carried out for both
models, in view of the collinearity issue pointed to earlier, in order to investigate the robustness of the
results.  Table 5 contains a summary of the assumptions underlying the simulations;  further details are found
in Day and Winer (2001). 
[Table 5 here.]
All the simulation results are reported as changes from a base case defined by the fitted values of
the model being simulated.  Because changes in populations flows are easier to comprehend than changes
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30.  See Day and Winer (2001) for more detailed simulation results, including the impact on total inflows and total
outflows for each province.
in migration rates, we translate the changes in predicted migration rates into changes in migration flows by
multiplying each origin-destination specific migration flow by the appropriate provincial population.  Then
the origin-destination specific flows are summed across provinces to obtain the change in net in-migration
for each province and income class.30  Finally, we report only the average change over the 1978-1996 period.
This time period was chosen because prior to 1978, there was no regional variation in MIN, a key UI policy
variable.
It should be noted that although the simulations cover a 19-year period, they are not dynamic.
Rather, in each year the same policy change is treated as if it were being introduced that year for the very first
time.  The average changes reported can thus be viewed as the average impact effect of introducing the policy
change.  We chose to focus on average impact effects for two reasons: first, the inability of all versions of
the model estimated to do a good job of explaining year-to-year fluctuations in migration flows; and second,
the fact that our model does not allow us to predict the effects of migration flows on such determinants of
migration such as average weekly earnings or the probabilities of the states of the world.
5.1   Effects on the volume of migration
First we consider the effect of eliminating regional differences in the explanatory variables on the
volume of interprovincial migration.  Table 6 presents the change in the total number of migrants relative
to the base case (the status quo), in both absolute and percentage terms, for the eleven different simulations
that were carried out using Models 1 and 2.  The change in the volume of migration is computed by summing
gross outflows across provinces for each income class.  
[Table 6 here.]
A comparison across simulations of the percentage change in the total number of migrants, shown
in the lower panels of the tables, indicates that moving costs are by far the single most important determinant
of the volume of migration in Canada, easily dominating the role of the employment probabilities by two or
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three orders of magnitude.  In turn, the role of the probabilities of the states of the world dominates the role
of average weekly earnings, by up to an order of magnitude (depending on the model used).  All the policy
variables considered together play a role that is somewhat larger than that of wages for Model 1 (4.82% vs.
3.33%), and about 1/3 as much as wages for Model 2.  The difference in results between models for this
simulation likely stems from the role of federal spending, which has a bigger percentage impact on mobility
for Model 1 (2.36%) than for Model 2 (0.32%). 
Individually, the remaining policy variables, including the UI variables, play a much less important
role (except for federal spending in Model 1).  Provincial tax rates have an effect that, for each income class,
is more or less the same for the two models.  It is interesting to note that in the case of tax rates, the overall
change in the number of migrants is smallest for the high income group.
The effect of eliminating regional differences in qualifying weeks for UI (MIN ) has a uniformly
small effect compared to, say, the effect of eliminating regional variation in wages in both models.  The
volume of migration is still relatively unchanged even when all regional variation is eliminated from the UI
system, a policy change that likely is at the extreme end of feasible reforms.  While there are some
differences across income classes, in all cases the gross change in the number of migrants is quite small when
compared to that for average weekly earnings or for the probabilities of the various employment states.
5.2   Effects on the pattern of migration
Even if regional dispersion in policy variables has little effect on the volume of migration, it may
still affect the pattern of migration, or the distribution of the population across regions.  Table 7 summarizes
the effect of the simulations on the pattern of interprovincial migration, for all income classes taken together.
In most cases, the signs of the coefficient estimates tell us something about the effect of regional variation
on the pattern of migration flows.  For example, as long as the coefficient of INCOME is positive, the
elimination of regional variation in provincial income tax rates will tend to increase net in-migration to
provinces where tax rates are relatively high, and reduce net in-migration to provinces where tax rates are
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31. No waiting period for the receipt of social assistance is allowed for in this calculation.
(18)
(19)
relatively low.  Indeed, this is exactly what happens for both Model 1 and Model 2: net in-migration rises
for the high-tax provinces of Quebec, Newfoundland, New Brunswick, and Nova Scotia, while net in-
migration to all other provinces decreases.  Similarly, the elimination of regional variation in average weekly
earnings (column (9) of Table 7) reduces net in-migration to the relatively high-wage provinces of Ontario,
Alberta, British Columbia, and Quebec, and raises net in-migration to all other provinces.
[Table 7 here.]
In other cases, the signs of the coefficient estimates alone are not sufficient to tell us what the
outcome of the simulations will be.  The two simulations involving the UI parameter MIN are a case in point.
The sign of the derivative of the migration rate with respect to MINj, given in equations (18) and (19) below,
is in fact ambiguous:
As shown by (19) – a similar argument applies to (18) – an increase in MINj will have two effects on
migration from i to j: first, since individuals must work longer to qualify for unemployment insurance
benefits in state 3, their wage income will rise and their social assistance income will fall.  As long as the
after-tax wage exceeds average weekly SA benefits (recall that individuals in state 3 are assumed to go on
social assistance when insurance benefits end),31 and the coefficient "1 is positive, this effect will tend to
increase inflows to region or province j.  Second, the individual’s leisure time will fall.  If "2 is also positive,
this effect will tend to reduce inflows to province j.  The larger is "2 relative to "1, or in other words, the
stronger is the individual’s preference for leisure relative to consumption, the more likely it is that the net
effect will be negative so that on balance, people leave the region where the insurance system becomes less
26
32. It should be noted that for the high income group using Model 2, the coefficient of LEISURE is negative, which
has the effect of reversing the direction of the effects of eliminating regional variation in MIN and regional extended
benefits. But the direction of the aggregate effects for all income classes together, while an order of magnitude larger
in Model 1 than in Model 2, is still the same.
generous. 
When regional variation in MIN is eliminated over the 1978-1996 period, MIN rises in the Atlantic
provinces, Quebec, and British Columbia, where it previously was lowest.  The results in Table 7 show that
in these provinces, net in-migration falls as a result of this hypothetical policy change.  Net in-migration rises
in the remaining provinces, which experience a decrease in MIN.  Similar results are obtained when regional
extended benefits are eliminated, both alone and in conjunction with the elimination of variation in MIN.32
The elimination of all policy variation – an unlikely policy scenario in a federal country like Canada
– has more substantial consequences for the regional distribution of population than the individual policy
simulations.  In both models, Ontario is a net loser of population in this simulation, while the pattern across
the other provinces varies with the model employed.  The implication is that regional variation in public
policy in the country as a whole over the last two decades has not been accomplished at Ontario’s expense.
Finally, to complete the discussion of the effects of policy on the pattern of migration,  it is
interesting to examine the effect of the elimination of moving costs.  As column (11) indicates, the result is
to redistribute people away from the two central provinces, Ontario and Quebec, to the periphery of the
country.  This result does not imply that in the absence of moving costs, Ontario and Quebec are less
attractive overall than the other provinces; rather it is simply a consequence of the fact that Ontario and
Quebec have the largest populations. Consequently, a small increase in the rate of out-migration from either
of these provinces can lead to a bigger outflow of people than a large change in the rate of out-migration from
one of the smaller provinces.
5.3   An assessment of the consequences of regional variation in policy variables
A number of authors, in particular Courchene (1970, 1978), have suggested that the phenomenon of policy-
induced migration may exacerbate regional disparities in unemployment rates in Canada by making high-
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unemployment regions more attractive than they otherwise would be.  However, to our knowledge, no
empirical study has directly examined this issue. 
Because we model only migration behaviour, we cannot say anything conclusive about the impact
of migration on labour market behaviour.  But we can estimate the change in provincial unemployment rates
resulting from the simulations reported above if we make some assumptions about the impact of migration
on unemployment. Accordingly, we assume that all out-migrants from a province were previously
unemployed, while all in-migrants to the province will end up employed.  Then the change in in-migration
will always equal the change in employment, while the change in out-migration will equal the change in
unemployment.
This pair of assumptions represents the most favourable outcome possible in terms of the impact
effect of migration on unemployment rates.  In fact, some interprovincial migrants will likely be moving from
one job to another, while others will be unemployed in both province of origin and province of destination.
Thus calculations based on these assumptions are likely to over-estimate any reduction in unemployment
rates that might result from the elimination of regional variation in policy and other variables.
The results of our calculations of the impact of eliminating regional variation in selected variables
on provincial unemployment rates are presented in Table 8.  As in the case of the simulations, only the
average unemployment rate for the 1978-1996 period – computed using average employment and average
unemployment data for the period for individuals of both sexes aged 20-64 – is presented.  The calculations
are carried out using the simulation results for Models 1 and 2, summed over all income classes, derived from
the coefficient estimates in Table 2.  The actual average unemployment rate for each province during the
period is also presented.
[Table 8 here.]
Mirroring the results in Table 7, the hypothetical unemployment rate calculations for both models
indicate that the elimination of moving costs has by far the largest impact on unemployment  Indeed, the
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hypothetical unemployment rates for this simulation are actually negative, reflecting the fact that the
simulated increase in the volume of out-migration exceeded the actual level of unemployment in all
provinces.  One interpretation of this result is that the elimination of moving costs would encourage many
individuals not currently included in Statistics Canada’s measure of the labour force to make interprovincial
moves.
Turning to the other ten simulations, it can be seen that their effects on average unemployment rates
are generally not big, even for Model 1 for which changes in migration flows tend to be largest.  One
simulation which seems to have a greater impact on average unemployment rates than most of the others is
that in which regional variation in the probabilities of the states of the world is eliminated, but the effect is
different for different provinces.  Both Models 1 and 2 predict increases in average unemployment rates for
all the Atlantic provinces except Nova Scotia under this scenario, with the largest increase being 1.5
percentage points for Prince Edward Island in the case of Model 1.  Both models also predict that this
scenario will lead to decreases in unemployment rates in Ontario, Manitoba, Saskatchewan, and Alberta, with
the largest decrease being 2.1 percentage points for Saskatchewan under Model 2.
The only other simulations which result in changes of more than one percentage point in average
unemployment rates are the elimination of regional variation in per capita federal spending and the
elimination of regional variation in all policy variables.  However, the relatively large negative effect of the
latter simulation on unemployment rates in Nova Scotia and Prince Edward Island under Model 1 (decreases
of 1.8 and 3.3 percentage points respectively) appears to be related to the positive coefficients on per capita
federal spending for Model 1.  For Model 2, where the coefficients on per capita federal spending are
negative, the elimination of regional variation in all policy variables actually increases unemployment rates
in these provinces, rather than reducing them.
Finally, it is important to note that even in the case of Model 1, which yields the largest changes in
migration flows when regional variation in the unemployment insurance system is eliminated, the impact on
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average unemployment rates of the elimination of this variation is small.  The Model 1 results lead to changes
in unemployment rates only in the four Atlantic provinces, with the largest decrease in unemployment rates
being half a percentage point in Prince Edward Island.  Under Model 2, average unemployment rates in all
ten provinces are completely unaffected by the elimination of regional variation in unemployment insurance.
It should also be remembered that the policy change introduced – the complete elimination of regional policy
variation – is very large,  so that half a percentage point is likely to be an upper bound for the effects of
marginal policy changes in the UI system that may occur in the future. 
6.  Conclusions and suggestions for further research 
Modelling gross interprovincial migration flows is a challenging task. In a study of policy-induced migration,
the dependence of unemployment insurance benefits on provincial unemployment rates makes it hard to
distinguish their separate influences on migration behaviour. To reach conclusions regarding the importance
of unemployment insurance and other public polices on interprovincial migration flows, we estimate two
variants of a basic migration model, and we rely upon simulations that explore the effects of eliminating
regional dispersion in key determinants of migration behaviour.  The results with respect to policy variables
are placed into perspective by simulating the consequences of the elimination of regional variation in wages,
employment prospects and moving costs. Previous studies of fiscally-induced migration have not placed
much, if any, emphasis on carrying out such simulations.
As a whole, the results confirm that the major determinants of interprovincial migration are
differentials in earnings, employment prospects and moving costs, with moving costs being the most
important of the three.  The average annual impact of the public policies considered here on the volume of
migration – that is, on the total number of Canadians who make interprovincial moves – is small.  The
estimated models predict that the elimination of both regional extended benefits and regional differences in
qualifying requirements for unemployment insurance would have increased the volume of migration by less
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than 1%.  Even the simultaneous elimination of regional variation in all the policy variables included in the
analysis (unemployment insurance, personal income taxes, social assistance and provincial and federal
spending on goods and services) is predicted to raise the volume of migration by at most 5%, or by less than
half a percentage point, depending on the specific model used.  By way of contrast, the estimates indicate
that the complete elimination of moving costs would raise the volume of migration by 5,000%.  
To further explore the nature of the relationship between public policies, migration, and provincial
unemployment rates, we calculated hypothetical average unemployment rates that might have been observed
in the absence of any regional policy differences.  These calculations suggest that regional differences in
public policies have had very little impact on regional disparities in unemployment rates in Canada.  One
explanation for this result is that the sort of policy changes we have experienced over the last three decades
have not been large enough to overcome the costs of moving away from ‘home.’ 
Although regional differences in public policies may not have had a large impact on interprovincial
migration,  our results indicate that some extraordinary public policy events did. The events surrounding and
following the election of the separatist Parti Québecois government in Québec in the second half of the
1970s, and the closing of the cod fishery in Atlantic Canada in 1992 appear to have had substantial
consequences for interprovincial migration.  These results suggest that one must be careful to distinguish
between the effects of marginal changes in policy, and the effects of large, discrete changes which may
swamp the retarding influence of even high fixed moving costs. While marginal changes in the
unemployment insurance system between 1974 and 1996 may not have important consequences for
interregional migration or regional unemployment rates, complete elimination of this system of income
support, which is more important on average to people in poorer regions, is not a shock that is represented
in the data, and the effects of such an extraordinary policy change cannot be inferred from our results.
If the transfer dependency thesis is to retain its currency, then, it appears necessary to interpret it in
the light of our finding that marginal changes in policy variables of the sort experienced since 1974 are not
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33. On this point, see also Emery (1999).  In such an alternative to the transfer dependency hypothesis, public
policies of various kinds, even when uniformly applied across the country, may influence regional disparities by
inducing shifts from work to leisure that are more pronounced in poorer parts of the country.  But the consequences
of public policy for interregional migration will not play a fundamental role in such an alternative view, perhaps
because of the existence of large fixed migration costs. 
34. The work of Rosenbluth (1996) will be helpful in this respect.
associated with substantial changes in migration patterns.  To do so, one might focus on the differential
effects across regions that (may) result from the existence of  income support programs, as distinct from the
effects of marginal changes in these programs, even when they are uniformly supplied across the country.
It also seems wise to consider alternative explanations for the persistence of regional disparities in which
migration does not play its classical role of equalizing opportunity because of high fixed moving costs.33 
 Several avenues for further research are suggested by the paper, and we conclude by briefly noting
some of them.  It is clear that there is room for additional work on models of interprovincial migration that
are better able to predict year-to-year changes in migration flows. This work should include more detailed
treatment of the effects of important social and political events in Quebec and of the events surrounding the
closing of the east coast cod fishery.  It would also be desirable to find new ways of dealing with the
collinearity of UI variables and employment prospects when modelling the effects of public polices. 
A model of interregional migration in which migration and labour market behaviour and performance
are all endogenously determined remains on the research agenda.34  And the role of intergovernmental grants
in determining migration patterns also remains to be uncovered, a task that will likely require that the
measurement of the net benefits of public services be improved so that a model of the effects of grants on
provincial fiscal decisions may be combined with a model of policy-induced migration.  Finally, in view of
the importance of moving costs revealed here, further attention to the measurement and role of such costs
in migration will be worthwhile. We hope that the present work, and the associated working paper containing
the full data appendixes, will be of help to those who wish to address any of these interesting projects in the
future.
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Table 1.  List of Explanatory Variables
Variable name Definition
Expected
sign
INCOME expected value of log of after-tax income +
LEISURE expected value of log of leisure time +
Public Expenditure:
HEALTH
EDUCATION
OTHER SPENDING
FEDERAL  SPENDING
log of real per capita provincial and local govt spending on health
log of real per cap provincial and local govt spending on education
log of real per cap provincial and local govt spending on other
functions, excluding social services and debt service
log of real per capita current and capital spending by the federal govt
+
+
?
+
Moving Costs:
    
DSTAY
 
DISTANCE
dummy variable equal to 1 if origin = destination, zero otherwise
log of distance between origin and destination
+
-
Additional Risk
Aversion:
  
 Model 1:  P2
                 P3
                 P4
 Model 2:  LP234
probability of state 2
probability of state 3
probability of state 4
log (P2 + P3 + P4)
-
-
-
-
Extraordinary Events:
   
PQ
PQ2
FISH
FISH2
dummy variable equal to 1 if outflow from Quebec, 1977-80; 0
otherwise
dummy variable equal to 1 if inflow to Quebec, 1977-80; 0 otherwise
dummy variable equal to 1 if outflow from Newfoundland, 1993-96; 0
otherwise
dummy variable equal to 1 if inflow to Newfoundland, 1993-96; 0
otherwise
+
-
+
-
Locational Attributes:
QUEBEC
NFLD
PEI
NS
NB
QUE
ONT
MAN
SASK
ALTA
dummy variable equal to 1 if province of origin is not Quebec and
province of destination is Quebec, 0 otherwise
dummy variable equal to 1 if choice is Newfoundland, 0 otherwise
dummy variable equal to 1 if choice is PEI, 0 otherwise
dummy variable equal to 1 if choice is Nova Scotia, 0 otherwise
dummy variable equal to 1 if choice is New Brunswick, 0 otherwise
dummy variable equal to 1 if choice is Quebec, 0 otherwise
dummy variable equal to 1 if choice is Ontario, 0 otherwise
dummy variable equal to 1 if choice is Manitoba, 0 otherwise
dummy variable equal to 1 if choice is Saskatchewan, 0 otherwise
dummy variable equal to 1 if choice is Alberta, 0 otherwise
-
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
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Table 2.  Parameter estimates by income class, 1974-1996*
Model 1 Model 2
Variable
Low
Income
Middle
Income
High
Income 
Low
Income
Middle
Income
High
Income 
INCOME
LEISURE
HEALTH
EDUCATION
OTHER SPENDING
FEDERAL SPENDING
DSTAY
DISTANCE
LOG (P2+P3+P4)
P2
P3
P4
QUEBEC
PQ
PQ2
FISH
FISH2
NFLD
PEI
NS
NB
QUE
ONT
MAN
SASK
ALTA
1.806
(41.79) 
2.832
(12.61)
-0.471
(-28.24)
0.388
(26.35)
-0.198
(-22.91)
0.229
(22.95)
1.576
(155.60)
-0.502
(-349.25)
-28.979
(-40.50)
-13.396
(-18.53)
-9.890
(-13.11)
-2.243
(-407.27)
0.232
(29.48)
0.151
(15.87)
0.105
(10.47)
-0.883
(-60.65)
0.354
(27.45)
-0.883
(-66.57)
-0.491
(-40.99)
-0.052
(-5.41)
1.577
(204.72)
-0.252
(-41.76)
-1.046
(-156.59)
-1.136
(-176.52)
-0.543
(-90.62)
2.391
(63.93)
7.105
(36.29)
-0.414
(-29.33)
-0.007 
(-0.521)
-0.341
(-45.05)
0.493
(59.61)
1.848
(207.18)
-0.504
(-398.90)
-42.977
(-69.11)
-26.861
(-42.61)
-23.780
(-36.09)
-2.351
(-487.53)
0.405
(64.73)
0.156
(19.12)
-0.142
(-13.08)
-1.168
(-83.23)
0.469
(41.11)
-0.835
(-73.32)
-0.661
(-66.12)
-0.041
(-4.97)
1.897
(285.40)
-0.342
(-66.31)
-1.177
(-208.97)
-1.083
(-194.70)
-0.541
(-103.05)
1.507
(35.07)
4.887
(21.10)
-0.300
(-18.57)
-0.161
(-10.93)
-0.419
(-48.78)
0.514
(52.36)
1.378
(133.47)
-0.599
(-409.63)
-30.780
(-41.82)
-21.103
(-28.25)
-17.150
(-22.03)
-2.065
(-399.05)
0.486
(73.27)
0.076
(8.39)
-0.267
(-17.97)
-1.084
(-64.56)
0.054
(-3.87)
-1.521
(-110.37)
-1.069
(-90.12)
0.539
(-54.72)
1.505
(198.91)
-0.263
(-44.42)
-1.377
(-212.09)
-1.212
(-194.34)
0.542
(-91.09)
0.748
(18.35)
0.571
(26.87)
0.169
(11.19)
0.662
(45.04)
-0.357
(-41.89)
-0.429
(-52.02)
1.496
(149.42)
-0.517
(-365.71)
-0.748
(-127.85)
-2.240
(-406.51)
0.294
(37.61)
0.076
(8.08)
0.003
(0.316)
-0.790
(-54.54)
-0.572
(-56.85)
-0.992
(-78.46)
-0.211
(-17.93)
-0.335
(-37.89)
1.319
(180.53)
0.120
(24.06)
-0.721
(-112.50)
-1.010
(-159.85)
-0.595
(-99.59)
1.200
(34.23)
0.904
(46.70)
0.149
(11.57)
0.327
(25.22)
-0.494
(-66.51)
-0.214
(-31.05)
1.761
(199.67)
-0.521
(-419.18)
-0.842
(-158.58)
-2.348
(-486.77)
0.460
(74.28)
0.095
(11.69)
-0.291
(-26.83)
-1.030
(-73.62)
-0.641
(-71.78)
-1.049
(-97.81)
-0.378
(-39.23)
-0.428
(-56.57)
1.554
(248.98)
0.050
(11.57)
-0.839
(-153.21)
-0.971
(-177.33)
-0.589
(-112.58)
0.416
(10.29)
-0.010 
(-0.44)
0.192
(12.93)
0.054
(3.62)
-0.547
(-64.72)
-0.137 
(-1.66)
1.290
(126.24)
-0.616
(-427.42)
-0.477
(-79.98)
-2.066
(-399.20)
0.545
(83.36)
0.013 
(1.50)
-0.361
(-24.41)
-0.995
(-59.48)
-0.903
(-86.85)
-1.738
(-136.26)
-0.890
(-75.75)
-0.842
(-94.78)
1.274
(178.52)
0.039
(7.78)
-1.138
(-180.63)
-1.127
(-183.35)
-0.538
(-91.72)
Log L
Log L0
McFadden’s R2
No. of observations 
-7213435
-92028900
0.922
2300
-9794318
-165821900
0.941
2300
-8019435
-163142600
0.951
2300
-7216434
-92028900
0.922
2300
-9806258
-165821900
0.941
2300
-8022762
-163142600
0.951
2300
* Notes:  t-statistics are in parentheses.   Log L is the log of the likelihood function at the parameter estimates.  Log L0 is the maximum value of the log of the likelihood function when
only destination-specific constants included.  McFadden’s R2 is [1 - (log L / log  L0)].  Likelihood ratio tests for all equations indicate that the model with destination-specific constants
only can be rejected in favour of the full model at 1%.
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Table 3.  Correlations between Actual and Fitted Values of Migration Flows, Models 1 and 2, 1974-1996
Model 1 Model 2
Province
Out-
migration 
In-
migration 
Net In-
migration
Out-
migration 
In-
migration 
Net In-
Migration
Low Income
NFLD 0.7056 0.6714 0.6036 0.6532 0.7167 0.5091
PEI 0.7502 0.2045 0.5733 0.5497 0.3454 0.3309
NS 0.6840 0.7480 0.2486 0.7421 0.6861 0.3229
NB 0.7649 0.3106 0.3382 0.8438 0.2871 0.5312
QUE 0.6736 0.5995 0.693 0.5967 0.3994 0.348
ONT 0.5265 0.7879 0.7365 0.3549 0.8222 0.6954
MAN 0.4195 0.1050 0.3837 0.3141 0.1904 0.239
SASK 0.9149 0.6417 0.9251 0.7459 0.2377 0.4511
ALTA 0.7215 0.8640 0.9224 0.6774 0.8715 0.912
BC 0.6746 0.7744 0.7183 0.7166 0.7058 0.6563
Min 0.4195 0.105 0.2486 0.3141 0.1904 0.239
Max 0.9149 0.864 0.9251 0.8438 0.8715 0.912
Middle Income 
NFLD 0.2356 0.5605 0.5172 0.3172 0.5461 0.6137
PEI 0.3663 -0.3435 0.6796 0.1264 -0.4364 0.592
NS 0.2530 -0.3374 0.3818 0.4873 -0.5146 0.4161
NB 0.2237 -0.4951 0.3329 0.5579 -0.5301 0.4997
QUE 0.6163 -0.2996 0.8291 0.4902 -0.3059 0.6249
ONT 0.3532 0.2037 0.5916 0.0886 0.3694 0.5168
MAN -0.0794 -0.3160 0.3911 -0.3990 -0.1169 0.0384
SASK 0.6212 0.2966 0.9063 0.4983 -0.6436 0.4091
ALTA 0.3013 0.6468 0.9081 0.2399 0.6939 0.8917
BC 0.2496 0.5823 0.7315 0.2931 0.4002 0.6684
Min -0.0794 -0.4951 0.3329 -0.399 -0.6436 0.0384
Max 0.6212 0.6468 0.9081 0.5579 0.6939 0.8917
High Income 
NFLD 0.3743 0.6574 0.5172 0.4324 0.6526 0.2887
PEI 0.2214 -0.0985 0.6796 0.1965 -0.1708 0.304
NS 0.6598 0.6096 0.3818 0.7070 0.5084 0.1657
NB 0.4530 -0.2934 0.3329 0.5555 -0.3366 0.0978
QUE 0.6253 0.3086 0.8291 0.5645 0.2288 0.7139
ONT 0.2221 0.6598 0.5916 0.1615 0.7378 0.6437
MAN -0.0017 -0.1079 0.3911 -0.1648 -0.0663 0.0085
SASK 0.8495 0.1958 0.9063 0.7610 -0.2086 0.1088
ALTA 0.7960 0.5533 0.9081 0.7684 0.5103 0.9423
BC 0.3954 0.6371 0.7315 0.4146 0.5284 0.6614
Min -0.0017 -0.2934 0.3329 -0.1648 -0.3366 0.0085
Max 0.8495 0.6598 0.9081 0.7684 0.7378 0.9423
37
T
ab
le
 4
.  
E
ff
ec
t 
of
 E
xt
ra
or
di
na
ry
 E
ve
nt
s 
on
 M
ig
ra
ti
on
 T
o 
an
d 
F
ro
m
 Q
ue
be
c 
an
d 
N
ew
fo
un
dl
an
d.
E
st
im
at
ed
 c
ha
ng
e 
in
 in
fl
ow
s 
an
d 
ou
tf
lo
w
s 
as
 a
 r
es
ul
t o
f 
th
e 
ev
en
t
M
od
el
  1
M
od
el
 2
L
ow
 in
co
m
e
M
id
dl
e
in
co
m
e
H
ig
h
in
co
m
e
T
ot
al
L
ow
in
co
m
e
M
id
dl
e
in
co
m
e
H
ig
h
in
co
m
e
T
ot
al
E
le
ct
io
n 
of
 P
ar
ti
 Q
ue
bé
co
is
: 
19
77
-1
98
0
In
-m
ig
ra
ti
on
 to
 Q
ue
be
c
O
ut
-m
ig
ra
ti
on
 f
ro
m
 Q
ue
be
c
N
et
 In
-m
ig
ra
ti
on
 to
 Q
ue
be
c
20
49
47
54
-2
70
5
28
58
13
34
0
-1
04
82
11
52
14
31
4
-1
31
62
60
59
32
40
8
-2
63
49
10
74
58
44
-4
77
0
17
88
14
77
5
-1
29
87
21
0
15
62
5
-1
54
15
30
72
36
24
4
-3
31
72
C
lo
si
ng
 o
f 
C
od
 F
is
he
ry
: 
19
93
-1
99
6
In
-m
ig
ra
ti
on
 to
 N
ew
fo
un
dl
an
d
O
ut
-m
ig
ra
ti
on
 f
ro
m
 N
ew
fo
un
dl
an
d
N
et
 In
-m
ig
ra
ti
on
 to
 N
ew
fo
un
dl
an
d
-7
55
3
13
14
-8
86
7
-1
24
57
-1
53
6
-1
09
22
-7
72
7
-1
58
0
-6
14
7
-2
77
37
-1
80
2
-2
59
36
-6
41
1 41
-6
45
2
-1
01
28
-3
37
6
-6
75
2
-6
73
8
-2
24
5
-4
49
3
-2
32
77
-5
58
0
-1
76
97
T
ab
le
 5
.  
Si
m
ul
at
io
n 
A
ss
um
pt
io
ns
Si
m
ul
at
io
n
N
o.
V
ar
ia
bl
e(
s)
 a
ff
ec
te
d
A
ss
um
pt
io
ns
(1
)
M
IN
 (
m
in
im
um
 q
ua
lif
yi
ng
 w
ee
ks
)
M
IN
 =
 1
3 
w
ee
ks
 in
 a
ll 
pr
ov
in
ce
s 
in
 a
ll 
ye
ar
s
(2
)
R
eg
io
na
l e
xt
en
de
d 
be
ne
fi
ts
2 
w
ee
ks
 o
f 
be
ne
fi
ts
 f
or
 e
ac
h 
qu
al
if
yi
ng
 w
ee
k 
of
 w
or
k 
in
 a
ll 
pr
ov
in
ce
s 
in
 a
ll 
ye
ar
s
(3
)
M
IN
 a
nd
 r
eg
io
na
l e
xt
en
de
d 
be
ne
fi
ts
C
om
bi
na
ti
on
 o
f 
(1
) 
an
d 
(2
)
(4
)
Pe
r 
ca
pi
ta
 f
ed
er
al
 s
pe
nd
in
g
R
ea
l p
er
 c
ap
it
a 
fe
de
ra
l s
pe
nd
in
g 
id
en
ti
ca
l i
n 
al
l p
ro
vi
nc
es
 (
m
od
el
 s
tr
uc
tu
re
 m
ak
es
 le
ve
l o
f 
 r
ea
l p
er
 c
ap
it
a 
sp
en
di
ng
 c
ho
se
n 
ir
re
le
va
nt
)
(5
)
Pe
r 
ca
pi
ta
 e
du
ca
ti
on
 s
pe
nd
in
g
R
ea
l p
er
 c
ap
it
a 
ed
uc
at
io
n 
sp
en
di
ng
 id
en
ti
ca
l i
n 
al
l p
ro
vi
nc
es
 (
m
od
el
 s
tr
uc
tu
re
 m
ak
es
 le
ve
l o
f 
 r
ea
l p
er
 c
ap
it
a 
sp
en
di
ng
 c
ho
se
n 
ir
re
le
va
nt
)
(6
)
Pr
ov
in
ci
al
 in
co
m
e 
ta
x 
ra
te
s
Pr
ov
in
ci
al
 p
ig
gy
ba
ck
 r
at
e 
se
t e
qu
al
 to
 th
e 
ni
ne
-p
ro
vi
nc
e 
av
er
ag
e 
in
 a
ll 
pr
ov
in
ce
s 
fo
r 
ea
ch
 y
ea
r.
  Q
ue
be
c 
tr
ea
te
d 
lik
e 
pr
ov
in
ce
s 
th
at
 a
re
 s
ig
na
to
ri
es
 to
th
e 
ta
x 
co
lle
ct
io
n 
ag
re
em
en
t w
it
h 
th
e 
fe
de
ra
l g
ov
er
nm
en
t.
(7
)
So
ci
al
 a
ss
is
ta
nc
e 
be
ne
fi
ts
A
nn
ua
l s
oc
ia
l a
ss
is
ta
nc
e 
be
ne
fi
ts
 s
et
 e
qu
al
 to
 th
e 
te
n-
pr
ov
in
ce
 a
ve
ra
ge
 in
 a
ll 
pr
ov
in
ce
s 
fo
r 
ea
ch
 y
ea
r
(8
)
A
ll 
po
lic
y 
va
ri
ab
le
s
C
om
bi
na
ti
on
 o
f 
(3
),
 (
4)
, (
5)
, (
6)
, a
nd
 (
7)
(9
)
A
ve
ra
ge
 w
ee
kl
y 
ea
rn
in
gs
A
ve
ra
ge
 w
ee
kl
y 
ea
rn
in
gs
 s
et
 e
qu
al
 to
 C
an
ad
ia
n 
In
du
st
ri
al
 C
om
po
si
te
 v
al
ue
 in
 a
ll 
pr
ov
in
ce
s 
fo
r 
ea
ch
 y
ea
r.
  F
or
eg
on
e 
w
ag
e 
co
st
s 
of
 m
ov
in
g 
ad
ju
st
ed
ac
co
rd
in
gl
y.
(1
0)
Pr
ob
ab
ili
ti
es
 o
f 
st
at
es
 o
f 
th
e 
w
or
ld
Fo
r 
ea
ch
 p
ro
vi
nc
e,
 p
ro
ba
bi
lit
ie
s 
co
m
pu
te
d 
fo
r 
th
e 
ag
gr
eg
at
e 
of
 th
e 
te
n 
pr
ov
in
ce
s 
fo
r 
ea
ch
 y
ea
r 
w
er
e 
us
ed
.  
U
I b
en
ef
it
s 
in
 e
ac
h 
st
at
e 
of
 th
e 
w
or
ld
 r
e-
co
m
pu
te
d,
 u
si
ng
 a
ct
ua
l g
ui
de
lin
es
, u
nd
er
 a
ss
um
pt
io
n 
th
at
 u
ne
m
pl
oy
m
en
t r
at
e 
eq
ua
l t
o 
C
an
ad
ia
n 
av
er
ag
e 
va
lu
e 
in
 a
ll 
te
n 
pr
ov
in
ce
s 
fo
r 
ea
ch
 y
ea
r.
(1
1)
M
ov
in
g 
co
st
s
A
ll 
m
ov
in
g 
co
st
s 
se
t e
qu
al
 to
 z
er
o:
 C
 =
 D
IS
T
 =
 D
ST
A
Y 
fo
r 
al
l i
 a
nd
 j 
an
d 
al
l y
ea
rs
38
T
ab
le
 6
.  
E
ff
ec
t 
on
 V
ol
um
e 
of
 M
ig
ra
ti
on
 o
f 
E
lim
in
at
io
n 
of
 R
eg
io
na
l V
ar
ia
ti
on
 M
od
el
 1
M
od
el
 2
L
ow
M
id
dl
e
H
ig
h
L
ow
M
id
dl
e
H
ig
h
V
ar
ia
bl
e
In
co
m
e
In
co
m
e
In
co
m
e
T
ot
al
In
co
m
e
In
co
m
e
In
co
m
e
T
ot
al
C
ha
ng
e 
in
 n
um
be
r 
of
 in
te
rp
ro
vi
nc
ia
l m
ig
ra
nt
s 
a
M
IN
59
 
63
 
-2
 
12
0 
8
4
2
14
R
eg
io
na
l e
xt
en
de
d 
be
ne
fi
ts
14
3 
24
8 
46
 
43
7 
19
10
1
30
M
IN
 a
nd
 r
eg
io
na
l e
xt
en
de
d 
be
ne
fi
ts
17
6 
32
8 
64
9 
1,
15
3 
22
13
1
37
P
er
 c
ap
ita
 f
ed
er
al
 s
pe
nd
in
g
72
7 
2,
04
0 
1,
17
5 
3,
94
1 
30
2
21
7
9
52
8
P
er
 c
ap
ita
 e
du
ca
tio
n 
sp
en
di
ng
61
 
-5
 
-1
64
 
-1
08
 
21
8
32
3
62
60
3
P
ro
vi
nc
ia
l i
nc
om
e 
ta
x 
ra
te
s
-3
07
 
-1
76
 
-4
3 
-5
27
 
-1
53
-1
48
-2
9
-3
31
So
ci
al
 a
ss
is
ta
nc
e 
be
ne
fi
ts
-1
42
 
-2
27
 
-1
27
 
-4
96
 
-5
9
-1
15
-3
5
-2
09
A
ll 
po
lic
y 
va
ri
ab
le
s
1,
45
5 
4,
15
9 
2,
42
8 
8,
04
2 
36
8
19
7
27
59
2
A
ve
ra
ge
 w
ee
kl
y 
ea
rn
in
gs
1,
08
7 
2,
88
8 
1,
58
8 
5,
56
3 
36
9
1,
26
2
38
6
2,
01
6
P
ro
ba
bi
li
ti
es
 o
f 
st
at
es
 o
f 
th
e 
w
or
ld
 
14
,1
02
 
26
,7
79
 
15
,1
04
 
55
,9
84
 
81
2
2,
82
8
2,
81
6
6,
45
5
M
ov
in
g 
co
st
s
1,
77
3,
05
4 
3,
12
0,
01
0 
3,
37
8,
92
4 
8,
27
1,
98
8 
1,
77
4,
27
2
3,
15
5,
66
2
3,
38
2,
17
3
8,
31
2,
10
6
C
ha
ng
e 
in
 n
um
be
r 
of
 in
te
rp
ro
vi
nc
ia
l m
ig
ra
nt
s 
as
 p
er
ce
nt
ag
e 
of
 b
as
e 
ca
se
 b
 
M
IN
0.
12
 
0.
10
 
-0
.0
0 
0.
07
 
0.
02
0.
01
0.
00
0.
01
R
eg
io
na
l e
xt
en
de
d 
be
ne
fi
ts
0.
28
 
0.
39
 
0.
09
 
0.
26
 
0.
04
0.
02
0.
00
0.
02
M
IN
 a
nd
 r
eg
io
na
l e
xt
en
de
d 
be
ne
fi
ts
0.
34
 
0.
52
 
1.
24
 
0.
69
 
0.
04
0.
02
0.
00
0.
02
P
er
 c
ap
ita
 f
ed
er
al
 s
pe
nd
in
g
1.
41
 
3.
22
 
2.
25
 
2.
36
 
0.
59
0.
34
0.
02
0.
32
P
er
 c
ap
it
a 
ed
uc
at
io
n 
sp
en
di
ng
0.
12
 
-0
.0
1 
-0
.3
1 
-0
.0
6 
0.
42
0.
51
0.
12
0.
36
P
ro
vi
nc
ia
l i
nc
om
e 
ta
x 
ra
te
s
-0
.6
0 
-0
.2
8 
-0
.0
8 
-0
.3
2 
-0
.3
0
-0
.2
3
-0
.0
6
-0
.2
0
So
ci
al
 a
ss
is
ta
nc
e 
be
ne
fi
ts
-0
.2
8 
-0
.3
6 
-0
.2
4 
-0
.3
0 
-0
.1
2
-0
.1
8
-0
.0
7
-0
.1
3
A
ll 
po
lic
y 
va
ri
ab
le
s
2.
83
 
6.
57
 
4.
65
 
4.
82
 
0.
72
0.
31
0.
05
0.
35
A
ve
ra
ge
 w
ee
kl
y 
ea
rn
in
gs
2.
12
 
4.
56
 
3.
04
 
3.
33
 
0.
72
1.
99
0.
74
1.
21
P
ro
ba
bi
lit
ie
s 
of
 s
ta
te
s 
of
 th
e 
w
or
ld
 
27
.4
4 
42
.3
3 
28
.8
9 
33
.5
4 
1.
58
4.
46
5.
38
3.
86
M
ov
in
g 
co
st
s
3,
44
9.
48
 
4,
93
1.
71
 
6,
46
3.
77
 
4,
95
5.
07
 
3,
44
7.
68
4,
97
7.
51
6,
46
2.
08
4,
97
1.
36
N
ot
es
: 
a   
N
um
be
r 
of
 m
ig
ra
nt
s 
 =
 s
um
 a
cr
os
s 
pr
ov
in
ce
s 
of
 g
ro
ss
 o
ut
-m
ig
ra
tio
n 
fl
ow
s.
b   
B
as
e 
ca
se
 is
 s
um
 o
f 
pr
ed
ic
te
d 
ou
t-
m
ig
ra
tio
n 
fl
ow
s 
fr
om
 M
od
el
 1
 o
r 
M
od
el
 2
 r
es
pe
ct
iv
el
y.
39
T
ab
le
 7
.  
E
ff
ec
t 
on
 t
he
 P
at
te
rn
 o
f 
M
ig
ra
ti
on
 o
f 
E
lim
in
at
io
n 
of
 R
eg
io
na
l V
ar
ia
ti
on
: 
P
er
ce
nt
ag
e 
C
ha
ng
e 
in
 N
et
 I
n-
M
ig
ra
ti
on
Si
m
ul
at
io
n
P
ro
vi
nc
e
(1
)
(2
)
(3
)
(4
)
(5
)
(6
)
(7
)
(8
)
(9
)
(1
0)
(1
1)
M
od
el
 1
N
FL
D
P
E
I
N
S
N
B
Q
U
E
O
N
T
M
A
N
SA
SK
A
L
T
A
B
C
-3
5.
4
-2
54
.7
-1
7.
0
-1
84
.8
-1
.2
10
6.
9
7.
0
9.
6
13
.7
-0
.6
-5
0.
9
-3
18
.0
-1
38
.1
-3
94
.6
-1
4.
0
25
1.
0
14
.8
30
.3
27
.3
-2
.4
-6
9.
2
-4
58
.1
-1
28
.1
-4
14
.8
-1
3.
5
25
8.
1
18
.2
36
.9
36
.2
-2
.2
26
.5
-1
71
0.
4
-2
54
8.
7
-6
76
.1
90
.3
-1
39
.4
-7
8.
9
12
1.
1
29
7.
9
32
.4
-2
.8
21
.4
37
.5
90
.9
-3
.6
-2
8.
0
4.
5
3.
3
-1
9.
0
1.
7
22
.6
-2
6.
9
27
.8
13
6.
1
70
.3
-2
79
.1
-0
.1
-8
.2
-9
9.
1
-3
.8
-0
.3
-1
7.
6
-1
7.
0
57
.1 1.
7
-1
2.
5
-1
.2 1.
1
3.
5
-0
.7
-8
0.
9
-2
89
6.
4
-3
11
5.
7
-1
68
1.
2
16
0.
5
-6
12
.6
-8
4.
4
17
2.
5
76
1.
0
28
.3
9.
4
22
95
.4
87
2.
9
10
03
.8
-1
0.
1
-8
80
.5
84
.3
13
7.
6
-1
74
.2
-3
2.
0
16
90
.7
92
67
.5
25
60
.1
11
48
9.
1
23
8.
8
-6
58
6.
7
-2
77
.8
-4
98
.6
-1
15
3.
4
34
.7
12
43
3.
9
17
24
43
.3
96
25
5.
5
14
29
36
.9
-2
22
49
.9
-1
69
86
0.
5
88
25
.4
13
42
6.
2
18
97
2.
8
54
68
.7
M
od
el
 2
N
FL
D
P
E
I
N
S
N
B
Q
U
E
O
N
T
M
A
N
SA
SK
A
L
T
A
B
C
-2
.0
-2
4.
4
-0
.8
-1
0.
9
-0
.1
16
.8 0.
3
0.
6
0.
6
0.
0
-4
.1
11
.6
-7
.7
-4
7.
3
-0
.8
48
.2 0.
9
2.
4
1.
7
-0
.1
-4
.7
-2
7.
2
-9
.7
-4
1.
0
-0
.7
52
.4 1.
0
2.
7
1.
8
-0
.1
-1
8.
5
98
7.
6
13
91
.4
35
0.
0
-4
6.
3
39
.4
37
.7
-6
5.
6
-1
51
.9
-1
5.
9
-9
.5
93
.0
19
3.
0
42
3.
5
-2
0.
7
-1
46
.1
24
.1
19
.5
-1
16
.5
12
.2
9.
9
-1
1.
4
12
.6
58
.2
29
.4
-1
15
.8
-0
.1
-3
.5
-4
2.
2
-1
.6
-0
.2
-7
.6
-7
.5
25
.2 0.
8
-5
.4
-0
.5 0.
4
1.
5
-0
.3
-1
9.
5
16
12
.7
10
34
.0
46
7.
5
3.
2
-1
07
7.
2
11
.5
49
.4
23
2.
4
-2
4.
4
4.
2
96
4.
8
36
3.
2
41
6.
2
-4
.3
-3
63
.5
34
.6
56
.9
-7
2.
6
-1
3.
4
33
7.
9
27
01
.9
96
4.
1
36
62
.1
17
1.
2
-1
82
9.
2
-3
8.
4
-2
11
.7
-8
89
.0
48
.3
12
83
2.
1
16
38
85
.7
91
43
8.
7
13
66
51
.2
-2
30
64
.5
-1
70
35
0.
1
91
76
.3
14
01
1.
6
22
94
3.
1
54
09
.8
Si
m
ul
at
io
ns
:
(1
) 
M
IN
(5
) 
P
er
 c
ap
it
a 
ed
uc
at
io
n 
sp
en
di
ng
(9
) 
A
ve
ra
ge
 w
ee
kl
y 
ea
rn
in
gs
(2
) 
R
eg
io
na
l e
xt
en
de
d 
be
ne
fi
ts
(6
) 
P
ro
vi
nc
ia
l i
nc
om
e 
ta
x 
ra
te
s
(1
0)
 P
ro
ba
bi
li
ti
es
 o
f 
st
at
es
 o
f 
th
e 
w
or
ld
(3
) 
M
IN
 a
nd
 r
eg
io
na
l e
xt
en
de
d 
be
ne
fi
ts
(7
) 
S
oc
ia
l a
ss
is
ta
nc
e 
be
ne
fi
ts
 
(1
1)
 M
ov
in
g 
co
st
s
(4
) 
P
er
 c
ap
it
a 
fe
de
ra
l s
pe
nd
in
g
(8
) 
A
ll
 p
ol
ic
y 
va
ri
ab
le
s
40
T
ab
le
 8
.  
H
yp
ot
he
ti
ca
l U
ne
m
pl
oy
m
en
t 
R
at
es
 R
es
ul
ti
ng
 f
ro
m
 E
lim
in
at
io
n 
of
 R
eg
io
na
l D
is
pe
rs
io
n 
(a
ve
ra
ge
 1
97
8-
19
96
) 
a
S
im
ul
at
io
n
N
F
L
D
P
E
I
N
S
N
B
Q
U
E
O
N
T
M
A
N
S
A
S
K
A
L
T
A
B
C
M
od
el
 1
M
IN
16
.7
 
13
.7
 
11
.3
 
12
.0
 
10
.8
 
7.
4 
7.
2 
6.
4 
7.
4 
9.
6 
R
eg
io
na
l e
xt
en
de
d 
be
ne
fi
ts
16
.6
 
13
.6
 
11
.2
 
11
.9
 
10
.8
 
7.
4 
7.
2 
6.
4 
7.
4 
9.
6 
M
IN
 a
nd
 r
eg
io
na
l e
xt
en
de
d 
be
ne
fi
ts
16
.5
 
13
.4
 
11
.2
 
11
.9
 
10
.8
 
7.
4 
7.
2 
6.
4 
7.
4 
9.
6 
P
er
 c
ap
it
a 
fe
de
ra
l s
pe
nd
in
g
16
.8
 
12
.1
 
9.
9 
11
.7
 
10
.9
 
7.
4 
6.
8 
6.
6 
7.
5 
9.
6 
P
er
 c
ap
it
a 
ed
uc
at
io
n 
sp
en
di
ng
16
.8
 
13
.9
 
11
.3
 
12
.1
 
10
.8
 
7.
4 
7.
2 
6.
3 
7.
4 
9.
6 
P
ro
vi
nc
ia
l i
nc
om
e 
ta
x 
ra
te
s
16
.9
 
13
.9
 
11
.3
 
12
.1
 
10
.9
 
7.
4 
7.
2 
6.
3 
7.
3 
9.
6 
S
oc
ia
l a
ss
is
ta
nc
e 
be
ne
fi
ts
16
.8
 
13
.9
 
11
.3
 
12
.1
 
10
.8
 
7.
4 
7.
2 
6.
3 
7.
4 
9.
6 
A
ll
 p
ol
ic
y 
va
ri
ab
le
s
16
.4
 
10
.6
 
9.
5 
11
.3
 
10
.9
 
7.
3 
6.
8 
6.
7 
7.
7 
9.
6 
A
ve
ra
ge
 w
ee
kl
y 
ea
rn
in
gs
16
.7
 
15
.0
 
11
.5
 
12
.2
 
10
.8
 
7.
3 
7.
3 
6.
6 
7.
2 
9.
5 
P
ro
ba
bi
li
ti
es
 o
f 
st
at
es
 o
f 
th
e 
w
or
ld
17
.1
 
15
.4
 
11
.3
 
13
.1
 
10
.9
 
6.
5 
5.
6 
4.
2 
6.
3 
9.
5 
M
ov
in
g 
co
st
s
-3
7.
9 
-8
.1
 
-5
6.
3 
-4
7.
2 
-8
2.
9 
-8
7.
6 
-4
6.
3 
-4
0.
9 
-5
2.
4 
-3
9.
0 
M
od
el
 2
M
IN
16
.8
 
13
.9
 
11
.3
 
12
.0
 
10
.8
 
7.
4 
7.
2 
6.
3 
7.
4 
9.
6 
R
eg
io
na
l e
xt
en
de
d 
be
ne
fi
ts
16
.8
 
13
.9
 
11
.3
 
12
.0
 
10
.8
 
7.
4 
7.
2 
6.
3 
7.
4 
9.
6 
M
IN
 a
nd
 r
eg
io
na
l e
xt
en
de
d 
be
ne
fi
ts
16
.8
 
13
.9
 
11
.3
 
12
.0
 
10
.8
 
7.
4 
7.
2 
6.
3 
7.
4 
9.
6 
P
er
 c
ap
it
a 
fe
de
ra
l s
pe
nd
in
g
16
.7
 
14
.6
 
11
.8
 
12
.1
 
10
.8
 
7.
4 
7.
3 
6.
1 
7.
3 
9.
5 
P
er
 c
ap
it
a 
ed
uc
at
io
n 
sp
en
di
ng
16
.8
 
14
.0
 
11
.4
 
12
.2
 
10
.8
 
7.
4 
7.
2 
6.
4 
7.
3 
9.
6 
P
ro
vi
nc
ia
l i
nc
om
e 
ta
x 
ra
te
s
16
.8
 
13
.9
 
11
.3
 
12
.0
 
10
.8
 
7.
4 
7.
2 
6.
3 
7.
4 
9.
6 
S
oc
ia
l a
ss
is
ta
nc
e 
be
ne
fi
ts
16
.8
 
13
.9
 
11
.3
 
12
.0
 
10
.8
 
7.
4 
7.
2 
6.
3 
7.
4 
9.
6 
A
ll
 p
ol
ic
y 
va
ri
ab
le
s
16
.7
 
15
.0
 
11
.7
 
12
.2
 
10
.8
 
7.
3 
7.
2 
6.
5 
7.
6 
9.
5 
A
ve
ra
ge
 w
ee
kl
y 
ea
rn
in
gs
16
.8
 
14
.4
 
11
.4
 
12
.1
 
10
.8
 
7.
4 
7.
2 
6.
4 
7.
3 
9.
5 
P
ro
ba
bi
li
ti
es
 o
f 
st
at
es
 o
f 
th
e 
w
or
ld
17
.6
 
15
.3
 
11
.6
 
12
.9
 
10
.9
 
7.
2 
7.
0 
5.
6 
6.
8 
9.
7 
M
ov
in
g 
co
st
s
-3
7.
4 
-7
.9
 
-5
5.
6 
-4
6.
5 
-8
7.
5 
-8
7.
8 
-4
5.
5 
-4
0.
1 
-4
9.
7 
-3
9.
3 
A
ct
ua
l a
ve
ra
ge
 u
ne
m
pl
oy
m
en
t r
at
e 
b
16
.8
 
13
.9
 
11
.3
 
12
.0
 
10
.8
 
7.
4 
7.
2 
6.
3 
7.
4 
9.
6 
N
ot
es
 t
o 
T
ab
le
 8
: 
 a  
H
yp
ot
he
ti
ca
l u
ne
m
pl
oy
m
en
t r
at
es
 w
er
e 
co
m
pu
te
d 
un
de
r t
he
 a
ss
um
pt
io
ns
 th
at
 a
ll
 o
ut
-m
ig
ra
nt
s 
fr
om
 a
 p
ro
vi
nc
e 
w
er
e 
un
em
pl
oy
ed
 p
ri
or
 to
 m
ov
in
g,
 a
nd
 th
at
 a
ll
 in
-m
ig
ra
nt
s 
w
ou
ld
 b
e 
em
pl
oy
ed
 a
ft
er
 m
ov
in
g.
   
T
ot
al
em
pl
oy
m
en
t a
nd
 u
ne
m
pl
oy
m
en
t f
or
 b
ot
h 
se
xe
s 
ag
ed
 2
0-
64
, o
bt
ai
ne
d 
fr
om
 C
A
N
S
IM
 (s
ee
 A
pp
en
di
x)
, w
er
e 
us
ed
 a
s 
th
e 
ba
si
s 
fo
r t
he
 c
al
cu
la
ti
on
s.
  F
or
 e
ac
h 
si
m
ul
at
io
n 
av
er
ag
e 
em
pl
oy
m
en
t o
ve
r t
he
 1
97
8-
19
96
 p
er
io
d
w
as
 c
om
pu
te
d 
as
 a
ct
ua
l 
av
er
ag
e 
em
pl
oy
m
en
t 
pl
us
 t
he
 c
ha
ng
e 
in
  
in
-m
ig
ra
ti
on
, 
w
hi
le
 a
ve
ra
ge
 u
ne
m
pl
oy
m
en
t 
w
as
 c
om
pu
te
d 
as
 a
ct
ua
l 
av
er
ag
e 
 u
ne
m
pl
oy
m
en
t 
le
ss
 t
he
 c
ha
ng
e 
in
 o
ut
-m
ig
ra
ti
on
. 
 T
he
 a
ve
ra
ge
un
em
pl
oy
m
en
t r
at
e 
w
as
 th
en
 c
om
pu
te
d 
as
 th
e 
ra
ti
o 
of
 a
ve
ra
ge
 u
ne
m
pl
oy
m
en
t t
o 
th
e 
su
m
 o
f 
av
er
ag
e 
em
pl
oy
m
en
t a
nd
 a
ve
ra
ge
 u
ne
m
pl
oy
m
en
t. 
 T
he
 c
al
cu
la
ti
on
s 
w
er
e 
do
ne
 u
si
ng
 th
e 
si
m
ul
at
io
n 
re
su
lt
s 
fo
r 
M
od
el
1,
 b
as
ed
 o
n 
th
e 
pa
ra
m
et
er
 e
st
im
at
es
 fo
r i
nc
om
e 
cl
as
se
s 
fo
r 1
97
4-
19
96
.  
b  T
he
 a
ct
ua
l a
ve
ra
ge
 u
ne
m
pl
oy
m
en
t r
at
e 
w
as
 c
on
st
ru
ct
ed
 u
si
ng
 th
e 
av
er
ag
e 
an
nu
al
 v
al
ue
s o
f e
m
pl
oy
m
en
t a
nd
 u
ne
m
pl
oy
m
en
t o
ve
r t
he
 1
97
8-
19
96
pe
ri
od
.  
It
 is
 v
er
y 
si
m
il
ar
 in
 m
ag
ni
tu
de
 to
 th
e 
av
er
ag
e 
of
 a
nn
ua
l u
ne
m
pl
oy
m
en
t r
at
es
 o
ve
r 
th
is
 p
er
io
d.
1w
w w MIE
MIE w MIEj
R j j
j
= <≥

,
,
.
Policy-induced Migration in Canada. Kathleen M. Day and Stanley L. Winer
Data Appendix 
This Appendix provides further details regarding data sources for the explanatory variables.  As in the text, the
subscripts i, j, and s refer, respectively, to province of origin i, province of destination j, and state of the world s ( =1,2,3,4).
Time subscripts apply to all variables but have been omitted for convenience. A more extensive set of data appendixes is
provided in Day and Winer (2001). The discussion below is based on Appendix A of the much longer working paper.
A.1  Variables related to unemployment insurance
The variables MINj, MINWKSj, and MXYRj all depend on the provisions of the Unemployment Insurance Act and were
computed under the assumption that each province constituted a single UI region.  Thus qualifying weeks and weeks of benefits
were based on the provincial unemployment rates published by Statistics Canada.  Legislative changes during the sample period
were taken into account.  Data on national and provincial unemployment rates were obtained from CANSIM (series D44950,
D44971, D44992, D45013, D45034, D45055, D45076, D45097, D45118, D45139, and D45160).  Information on D, the benefit
replacement rate for unemployment insurance, was obtained from Statistics Canada catalogue 73-202S, Unemployment
Insurance Statistics 1995, p. 50, for the period 1966-1994, and from Marcel Bédard of HRDC for 1995 and 1996.  The values
used for 1971 and 1996, years in which important legislative changes occurred, were computed as simple averages of the new
and old values.  Information on Maximum weekly Insurable Earnings (or MIE) was obtained from Lin (1998) for the period
1972-1996.  Again, due to legislative changes, the value used for 1993 was computed as 0.25 times the new value plus 0.75
times the old value, while that for 1994 was computed as a simple average of the old and new values.  This information was
combined with data on average weekly earnings to construct UI benefits and , the replaceable wage, which was definedw j
R
as follows:
For further details on the construction of these variables, see Appendix D of Day and Winer (2001).
A.2  Probabilities of the states of the world
The variables and were constructed from special tabulations of data on UI recipients by age, sex, andp j20+ p
j
<20
length of benefit period, provided by Marcel Bédard of HRDC.  Data on employment and the number of recipients of regular
UI benefits in each province were obtained from Statistics Canada.  For the fiscal years 1981/82 to 1996/97, the number of
recipients of social assistance benefits was assumed to equal the number of SA cases, provided to us by Anne Tweddle of
HRDC.  For earlier years, the number of SA recipients was computed as the number of SA beneficiaries multiplied by the
province-specific average ratio of cases to beneficiaries for the fiscal years 1980/81 and 1981/82.  The fiscal year data were
converted to a calendar year basis by assuming a uniform distribution over the quarters.  For further details regarding the exact
data sources and calculations, see Appendix C of Day and Winer (2001).
A.3  Government expenditure variables
HEALTHj is consolidated provincial and local government spending on health in province j divided by POPj *qj;
EDUCATIONj is consolidated provincial and local government spending on education in province j divided by POPj *qj; and
OTHER SPENDINGj is total consolidated provincial and local government spending less the sum of consolidated provincial
and local government spending on health, education, social services, and debt charges in province j, all divided by POPj *qj.
POPj and qj are defined in section A.4 below.  Consolidated provincial and local government spending data, for the fiscal year
ending March 31st, were obtained from CANSIM for the period 1966-1995.  These data were converted to a calendar year basis
by taking weighted averages of spending for each pair of years as follows:
where EXPt is government expenditure in year t, CY indicates calendar year data, and FY stands for fiscal year data.  
2A change in the definition of the government sector introduced by Statistics Canada in 1997 resulted in a break in the
fiscal year data in 1996.  The 1996 data on the new basis were converted to the old basis by multiplying the 1996 value on the
new basis by the ratio of the 1995 value on the old basis and the 1995 value on the new basis, for each series retrieved. The
CANSIM matrix and series numbers for both the old and the new (post-revisions) series retrieved are given in the tables below.
CANSIM matrix and series numbers for consolidated provincial/local government spending data, old basis
Province Matrix Health Education Social Services Debt Charges Total Spending
NFLD
PEI
NS
NB
QUE
ONT
MAN
SASK
ALTA
BC
2808
2809
2810
2811
2812
2813
2814
2815
2816
2817
D465283
D465324
D465365
D465406
D465447
D465488
D465529
D465570
D465611
D465652
D465285
D465326
D465367
D465408
D465449
D465490
D465531
D465572
D465613
D465654
D465284
D465325
D465366
D465407
D465448
D465489
D465530
D465571
D465612
D465653
D465294
D465335
D465376
D465417
D465458
D465499
D465540
D465581
D465622
D465663
D465279
D465320
D465361
D465402
D465443
D465484
D465525
D465566
D465607
D465648
CANSIM matrix and series numbers for consolidated provincial/local government spending data, new basis
Province Matrix Health Education Social Services Debt Charges Total Spending
NFLD
PEI
NS
NB
QUE
ONT
MAN
SASK
ALTA
BC
8182
8183
8184
8185
8186
8187
8188
8189
8190
8191
D482602
D482667
D482732
D482797
D482862
D482927
D482992
D483057
D483122
D483187
D482613
D482678
D482743
D482808
D482873
D482938
D483003
D483068
D483133
D483198
D482607
D482672
D482737
D482802
D482867
D482932
D482997
D483062
D483127
D483192
D482627
D482692
D482757
D482822
D482887
D482952
D483017
D483082
D483147
D483212
D482598
D482663
D482728
D482793
D482858
D482923
D482988
D483053
D483118
D483183
Similarlily, FEDERAL SPENDINGj is defined as federal government current expenditure on goods and services plus
investment in fixed capital and inventories less capital consumption allowances, all divided by POPj *qj.  For the period 1966-
1995, these data were obtained from the Provincial Economic Accounts via CANSIM.  A change in the definition of the
government sector introduced by Statistics Canada in 1997 resulted in a break in the series in 1996.  1996 data on the old basis
were provided by Dan Finnerty of the Income and Expenditure Accounts Division, Statistics Canada, for federal government
current expenditure on goods and services.  1996 values for investment in fixed capital and inventories and capital consumption
allowances were constructed by multiplying the 1996 value on the new basis by the ratio of the 1995 value on the old basis and
the 1995 value on the new basis. The CANSIM matrix and series numbers for both the old and new series used are given in the
tables below.
3CANSIM matrix and series numbers for federal government spending data, old basis
Province Matrix
Current Expenditure on
Goods and Services
Investment in Fixed
Capital and Inventories
Capital Consumption
Allowances
NFLD
PEI
NS
NB
QUE
ONT
MAN
SASK
ALTA
BC
6757
6758
6759
6760
6761
6762
6763
6764
6765
6766
 D13233
D13253
D13273
D13293
 D13313
D13333
D13353
D13373
D13393
 D13413
D13243
D13263
D13283
D13303
D13323
D13343
D13363
D13383
D13403
D13423
D13242
D13262
D13282
D13302
D13322
D13342
D13362
D13382
D13402
D13422
CANSIM matrix and series numbers for federal government spending data, new basis
Province Matrix
Investment in Fixed Capital and
Inventories
Capital Consumption
Allowances
NFLD
PEI
NS
NB
QUE
ONT
MAN
SASK
ALTA
BC
9071
9072
9073
9074
9075
9076
9077
9078
9079
9080
D25804
D25827
D25850
D25873
D25896
D25919
D25942
D25965
D25988
D26011
D25801
D25824
D25847
D25870
D25893
D25916
D25939
D25962
D25985
D26008
A.4  Other variables
INTi interest, dividend, and miscellaneous investment income in province i  Source: CANSIM series D43205 (NFLD),
D43221 (PEI), D43237 (NS), D43252 (NB), D43269 (QUE), D43285 (ONT), D43301 (MAN), D43317 (SASK),
D43333 (ALTA), D44454 (BC).
Bis Per capita interest, dividend and miscellaneous investment income in states 1, 2, and 3. (Bi4 is zero in state 4), = INTi
/ POPi. .    
POPi population of province i.  Source: CANSIM series D2 (NFLD), D3 (PEI), D4 (NS), D5 (NB), D6 (QUE), D7 (ONT),
D8 (MAN), D9 (SASK), D10 (ALTA), D11 (BC).
qj  price of consumption goods in region j.  All-items regional city consumer price index for one major city in each
province, 1986=100.  The cities chosen were St. John’s, NFLD; Charlottetown, PEI; Halifax, NS; Saint John, NB;
Montreal, QUE; Toronto, ONT; Winnipeg, MAN; Saskatoon, SASK; Edmonton, ALTA; and Vancouver, BC.  Source
for cities other than Charlottetown: 1966-1971, Winer (19??); 1972-1996, CANSIM series P816000 (St. John’s),
P816400 (Halifax), P816600 (Saint John), P817000 (Montreal), P817400 (Toronto), P817800 (Winnipeg), P818200
(Saskatoon), P818400 (Edmonton), P818800 (Vancouver).  Source for Charlottetown: 1974-1996, CANSIM series
P816200; for the years 1966-1973, the CPI for Charlottetown was assumed to be the same as that for Halifax.
SAj4  standard social assistance (SA) benefits in region j in state 4, equal to the amount received by a single parent with two
children.  Source: Pierre Lefebvre. Two series, one for 1950 to 1992 and one for 1973 to 1994, were spliced together
by regressing the log of the newer series on the log of the older one, and then predicting values for 1968-1972
comparable to the newer series. Figures for 1995 and 1996 were derived using the figure for 'couple with 2 children'
from Welfare Incomes (National Council of Welfare, 1995, 1996). These figures for 1995 and 1996 were adjusted
downwards by removing the premium payed when there is two spouses. Difference between payment with one as
4opposed to two spouses calculated using Lefebvre data for 1994.  
TRj  transfers from the federal government, excluding unemployment insurance
= (Family and youth allowances + Adult occupational training payments + Miscellaneous and other payments) / POPi
.  Source: 1968-1995, CANSIM.  The CANSIM series and matrix numbers are given in the table below.  Data for 1996
on the same basis as the 1968-1995 data were supplied by Dan Finnerty, Income and Expenditure Accounts Division,
Statistics Canada.  CANSIM matrix and series numbers for these data appear in a table below.
wj average weekly earnings (including overtime), industrial composite/ aggregate, by province.  
Source: CANSIM.  In 1983 the survey upon which these data are based was modified considerably, resulting in a break
in the series.  (For further details regarding this change, see “Note to Users” in Statistics Canada catalogue 72-002,
Employment, Earnings and Hours, 1983.)  To convert them to the same basis as the new data, the data for 1966-1982
were adjusted using a scale factor equal to the average over the first three months of 1983 of the ratio of the new series
to the old series.  The CANSIM numbers for both the old and new series are given in a table below. 
DISTij  
Distance in kilometers between major city in province i and major city in province j.  The major cities selected were
St. John’s, Newfoundland; Charlottetown, Prince Edward Island; Halifax, Nova Scotia; Saint John, New Brunswick;
Montreal, Quebec; Toronto, Ontario; Winnipeg, Manitoba; Regina, Saskatchewan; Calgary, Alberta; and Vancouver,
British Columbia.  Source: AAA Road Atlas (1992), p. 127. The distance between P.E.I. and BC was computed as the
sum of the distances between P.E.I. and NB and NB and BC.
Cij = C1ij + C2ij
C1ij foregone wage cost of moving from i to j, defined as equal to 1, 1 and ½, or 2 weeks of foregone earnings, depending
on distance travelled.
C2ij = AC A DISTij + RC ADISTij .  Monetary cost of moving from i to j, defined as the air plane travel cost for one person
for the distance moved  plus the rail cost of moving one ton of freight for the same distance
AC  passenger revenue per passenger kilometre, air.  Source: 1966-1977, unpublished data from Statistics Canada; 1978-
1996, Statistics Canada catalogue 51-206.
RC Railway operating revenue per revenue ton-kilometre = railway operating revenue freight/ revenue ton-miles, converted
to kilometers
Source: Statistics Canada catalogue 52-216, Rail in Canada.
TAXijs amount of federal-provincial income tax paid by a person moving from i into state s in j, including adjustments for the
basic personal deduction/credit.  As in the actual tax system, taxable income includes UI benefits but not SA benefits.
Moving costs are also tax deductible.  Information on tax schedules and provincial tax rates was obtained from various
issues of Taxation Statistics (a Revenue Canada publication), The National Finances, and The Finances of the Nation
(both of which are publications of the Canadian Tax Foundation). For further details regarding the calculations can be
found in Appendix E of Day and Winer (2001).
5CANSIM Matrix and series numbers for data on government transfer payments to persons, old basis
Province Matrix
Family and youth
allowances
Adult occupational
training allowances
Miscellaneous and other
transfers
NFLD
PEI
NS
NB
QUE
NT
MAN
SASK
ALTA
BC
5068
5069
5070
5071
5072
5073
5074
5075
5076
6961
D42646
D42671
D42696
D42721
D42746
D42771
D42796
D42821
D42846
D44344
D42654
D42679
D42704
D42729
D42754
D42779
D42804
D42829
D42854
D44352
D42655
D42680
D42705
D42730
D42755
D42780
D42805
D42830
D42855
D44353
CANSIM numbers for average weekly earnings data
Province Old Series
(1966M01-1983M03)
New Series
(1983M01-1996M12)
NFLD
PEI
NS
NB
QUE
ONT
MAN
SASK
ALTA
BC
CANADA
D703300
D703350
D703360
D703410
D703460
D703660
D704010
D704060
D704160
D704316
D703000
L661222
L663101
L664926
L667585
L670290
L673960
L677569
L680500
L683346
L686578
L657711
Note: Monthly data were converted to annual by taking annual averages.
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